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ABSTRACT—By many accounts, the financial technology, or FinTech,
sector appears to have developed an innovative solution to assist low-income
workers with income shortfalls between standard paydays by displacing
fringe financial service providers, namely payday lenders. Earned wage
access programs facilitate early transfers of earned-but-unpaid wages to lowincome workers through mobile platforms, algorithmic technology, and GPS
tracking. To many, earned wage access programs represent a win-win for
employees and employers. These programs are believed to be cheaper and
safer alternatives to payday loans. Preliminary research also suggests these
programs improve labor-retention rates for employers and help reduce
financial distress for low-income employees. Consequently, a growing
number of employers, including Walmart Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc., have
partnered with earned wage access providers to offer these programs as an
employee benefit. Employees may also use third-party providers that bypass
employers to offer these programs directly through mobile-app stores. In less
than a decade, this nascent market has impressively achieved national scale,
hundreds of thousands of employer partnerships, millions of users, and
billions of dollars in transactions.
Yet, notwithstanding and perhaps because of these early successes,
these programs also have downsides that have been much less emphasized.
In particular, although the gatekeeping role that employers may play when
partnering with earned wage access programs has the potential to facilitate
improved pricing and service terms in the fringe financial market, such a role
also masks significant costs that are not fully disclosed to employees.
Additionally, the earned wage access market creates detrimental regulatory
blind spots and enables regulatory arbitrage by blurring the lines between
once-distinct financial services: money-transmission services and loan
services. Earned wage access programs have largely operated with minimal
legal constraints because they have generally been characterized as moneytransmission services, rather than loan services like payday loans. Building
on the FinTech literature, by analogy, this Article argues that this blanket
characterization of earned wage access programs is a mistake. Earned wage
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access programs have varying effects. In the absence of regulatory
guardrails, some programs can perpetuate, and in some instances exacerbate,
the very risks providers claim to eliminate when displacing short-term
creditors like payday lenders.
This Article proposes a federal-level regulatory framework based on
lending laws that addresses some of these unmitigated risks through the
imposition of consumer-protection requirements such as uniform price
disclosure, ability-to-repay rules, optional amortization mechanics,
mandatory credit reporting, and a right-to-rescind assignment. In doing so,
this Article aims to facilitate growth of the earned wage access market’s
functional improvements and prevent a mere shift to fringe FinTech, or
“FringeTech,” services.
AUTHOR—Visiting Assistant Professor, Duke University School of Law.
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“The ingenuity of man has not devised a contrivance by which usury can be
legalized . . . . [F]or the name by which the transaction is denominated is
altogether immaterial, if it appears that a loan of money was the foundation
and basis of the agreement which is under consideration.”
—Bank of Lumpkin v. Farmers’ State Bank†

INTRODUCTION
Earned wage access programs, or “earned wage programs,” 1 are
internet- and mobile-based platforms that have emerged in recent years to
serve as safer alternatives to much-maligned payday loans. Payday loans are
part of a nearly $80 billion credit market that has long served the small-sum

†

132 S.E. 221, 221 (Ga. 1926) (syllabus by the court).
These services are sometimes called “early wage access,” “on-demand pay,” “instant pay,” “daily
pay benefit,” or “earned income access.”
1
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credit needs of millions of primarily low- and moderate-income Americans,2
much to the dismay of many scholars, lawmakers, and consumer advocates.
These loans cost borrowers an average annual percentage rate (APR) of
nearly 400%.3 They also have well-documented detrimental effects on
borrowers’ financial health.4 Earned-wage programs promise to reduce
demand for payday loans by facilitating transfers of earned-but-unpaid
wages to workers in advance of their standard periodic paydays. It is
questionable, however, whether earned-wage programs offer consumers a
meaningful reprieve from payday loans.
Consider two fictional employees that we will call Jack and Jill for
illustrative purposes. Jack, the average Walmart employee, enjoys an
employee benefit that allows him to transfer a portion of his earned-butunpaid wages prior to his scheduled payday for a monthly subscription fee
of $6 that is subsidized by Walmart.5 And Jill, the average movie-theater
employee, uses a similar program downloaded from her mobile-application
store that does not charge her a fee at all but encourages her to tip for each
transfer. These earned-wage programs promise to create “a more equitable
financial system for the millions of people on the lowest rungs of the
economic ladder.”6 Many providers claim to give employees greater
autonomy in the timing of their pay without the need for expensive credit
products.7 In other words, earned-wage programs are said to make earned
2

See KAREN GRAHAM & ELAINE GOLDEN, 2019 FINANCIALLY UNDERSERVED MARKET SIZE
STUDY 3, app. at 12 (2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovation-files-2018/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/31170215/2019-Market-Size-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5P7L-B5EE]
(estimating annual loan volumes for credit products that are designed to be reimbursed in a one-time
payment, including overdraft protection, pawn services, online and storefront payday loans, and refundanticipation checks); see also Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?,
87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (discussing the origins of payday loans in check-cashing locations in the
early 1990s).
3
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE DEBT TRAP OF TRIPLE-DIGIT INTEREST RATE LOANS:
PAYDAY, CAR-TITLE, AND HIGH-COST INSTALLMENT LOANS (2019), https://www.responsible
lending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl-finfairness-payday-mar2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BE8B-AR57] (noting that payday loans carry average APRs of 391%).
4
See infra notes 277–282 and accompanying text.
5
See Anne Tergesen, Some Companies Offer a New Benefit: Payroll Advances and Loans, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-companies-offer-a-new-benefitpayroll-advances-and-loans-11567416601 [https://perma.cc/ZW8T-BXBP] (“Employees pay $6 a month
to use PayActiv . . . . [and] Walmart covers the cost for one month per quarter . . . .”).
6
Gaby Del Valle, How a Silicon Valley Startup Is Trying to Rebrand Payday Loans, VOX (May 22,
2019, 4:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2019/5/22/18636049/earnin-app-startup-payday-loansfintech [https://perma.cc/X36L-PCMQ] (paraphrasing Earnin founder Ram Palaniappan).
7
See, e.g., Donna Fuscaldo, Demand for Earned Wages Services Surging amid COVID-19, FORBES
(May 19, 2020, 3:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/donnafuscaldo/2020/05/19/demand-for-earnedwages-services-surging-amid-covid-19/?sh=106305a34b71 [https://perma.cc/STQ2-C324] (quoting an
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wages available on demand, like an ATM for your paycheck,8 rather than
offer a costly cash advance to be repaid at a later time, as in the payday-loan
context. However, a fundamental yet less explored question is whether Jack
and Jill are better off with earned-wage programs as compared to payday
loans.
Proponents of earned-wage programs assert that these programs
represent a significant improvement over payday loans and are long-overdue
innovations to a high-cost market that currently serves the small-sum
liquidity demands of many American workers.9 Between 50% to 78% of
Americans live paycheck to paycheck,10 and 40% cannot cover a $400
emergency expense.11 Add on the rising number of “gig economy” and
freelance workers with volatile incomes,12 and the fragility of U.S. household

industry executive, who said that “[i]f they get more access to their money[,] they don’t have to rely on
short term financing”).
8
See, e.g., Jeff Kauflin, VCs Bet $40 Million on Money App for Those Living Paycheck to Paycheck,
FORBES (July 19, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffkauflin/2018/07/19/payday-loansbe-gone-a-growing-set-of-startups-are-gunning-to-unseat-them/#18f219446850
[https://perma.cc/
XRX3-ZKJ8] (quoting DailyPay CEO, who stated that “DailyPay is an ATM for earned or unpaid
wages[;] . . . . [j]ust like an ATM, a user accesses her money and pays a transaction fee”).
9
See, e.g., Dan Quan, Don’t Sideline Earned Income Access, AM. BANKER (June 3, 2019, 10:00
AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/dont-sideline-earned-income-access [https://perma.cc/
9U5L-2TZE] (“For the first time, there is a viable market solution that has the promise of significantly
lowering the cost of helping consumers manage short term cash flow needs and improving their financial
lives.”).
10
The reported percentage of Americans living paycheck to paycheck varies—it is often between
50% and 78%, depending on the consumer survey. Ilyce Glink & Samuel J. Tamkin, A Breakdown of
What Living Paycheck to Paycheck Looks Like, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
2020/08/17/breakdown-what-living-paycheck-to-paycheck-looks-like/ [https://perma.cc/3YGY-6SH3];
see also, e.g., NEW DATA: 60 Percent of US Consumers Now Live Paycheck-to-Paycheck, PYMNTS
(Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.pymnts.com/coronavirus/2020/navigating-pandemic-consumers-paycheckto-paycheck/ [https://perma.cc/M9YK-J5F7] (“[A]bout six out of 10 U.S. consumers now report living
paycheck-to-paycheck . . . .”); Megan Leonhardt, 63% of Americans Have Been Living Paycheck to
Paycheck Since Covid Hit, CNBC (Dec. 11, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/
12/11/majority-of-americans-are-living-paycheck-to-paycheck-since-covid-hit.html [https://perma.cc/
3EZM-P8A2] (reporting 63%); Zack Friedman, 78% of Workers Live Paycheck to Paycheck, FORBES
(Jan. 11, 2019, 8:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/01/11/live-paycheck-topaycheck-government-shutdown/?sh=3295da0c4f10 [https://perma.cc/V4C3-2VV5] (reporting 78%).
11
Amelia Barwise & Mark Liebow, When Generosity Harms Health Care and Public Health,
109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 997, 997 (2019).
12
See, e.g., Penny Crosman, The Challenger Banks Catering to Gig-Economy Workers, AM.
BANKER (Feb. 19, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/list/the-challenger-bankscatering-to-gig-economy-workers [https://perma.cc/K953-GPYT] (discussing high-earning selfemployed workers, including attorneys and consultants, whose unpredictable earnings and cashflow
shortfalls made them prime payday-loan candidates).
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income simply cannot be overstated.13 The coronavirus pandemic has
underscored the precarity of American household finances14 and amplified
the already-high demand for immediate access to income.15 Yet, the dearth
of low-cost, income-smoothing solutions available to low-income
consumers makes the financial vulnerability of this consumer class more
acute. Notwithstanding the risks of payday loans, which include heightened
financial distress and insolvency,16 over 12 million17 primarily low-income
individuals spend an estimated $4.6 billion in fees on payday loans
annually.18 The prevalence of payday loans, despite their negative attributes,
suggests there are significant market and policy failures at play,19 which
make the payday-loan market ripe for innovative, new entrants like earnedwage programs.
Earned-wage programs facilitate wage transfers not only through novel
platforms but also through innovative business models and fee structures.
Specifically, earned-wage providers utilize two broad business models: the
employer-sponsored model and the third-party model. Employer-sponsored
13
See THEA GARON, ANDREW DUNN, KATY GOLVALA & ERIC WILSON, U.S. FINANCIAL HEALTH
PULSE: 2018 BASELINE SURVEY RESULTS 3 (2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovation-files2018/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/07151007/FHN-Pulse_Baseline_SurveyResults-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L7VZ-2CSP ] (finding that only 28% of Americans are “financially healthy”).
14
See David Harrison, Lack of Savings Worsens the Pain of Coronavirus Downturn, WALL ST. J.,
(Apr. 15, 2020, 11:48 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lack-ofsavingsworsens-the-pain-ofcoronavirus-downturn-11586943001 [https://perma.cc/4HDT-YRZ2].
15
See Kate Fitzgerald, Earned Wage Access: A Coronavirus Fad or a Turning Point for Payroll?,
PAYMENTSSOURCE (June 10, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.paymentssource.com/news/earned-wageaccess-a-coronavirus-fad-or-a-turning-point-for-payroll [https://perma.cc/YT3G-4NQC] (“Fintech firms
specializing in employer-sponsored EWA services have seen exponential user growth during the
pandemic, with the rising numbers of gig workers hired in health care, fast food and grocery sectors, and
new EWA providers continuing to join the fray.”).
16
See infra notes 277–282.
17
See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY
BORROW, AND WHY 4 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/
2012/pewpaydaylendingreportpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJQ3-7KUH].
18
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau expressed this concern when announcing an
amendment to 12 C.F.R. § 1041, known as the “Payday Rule.” See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain
High-Cost Installment Loans, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,382, 44,384 (July 22, 2020); CFPB Statement on Payday
Rule, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-statement-payday-rule/ [https://perma.cc/V7PJ-HQ6Z].
19
See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 100
(2008) (finding that minimum product safety standards are noticeably absent in the regulations of payday
loans, that payday loans are designed to obscure their risks and to exploit consumer misunderstanding,
and that ordinary market mechanisms, such as competition and expert advisors, cannot fully correct these
deficiencies); Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQUALITY 135, 159 (finding that
“[p]ayday loans . . . exploit[] the consumer’s optimism bias that predicts an ability to pay the loan in full
at the next payday, and discounts the inevitable recurrence of the cash shortage that prompted the loan”).
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providers partner with employers and human-resource firms to offer earnedwage programs as an employee benefit,20 while third-party providers bypass
employers to offer services directly to employees through the internet or
mobile applications.21 Under each model, earned-wage programs collect
payroll and timesheet data to estimate accrued net wages and make all or a
portion of such wages available for a fee. Earned wage program fees are
reflected as flat fees and their structures vary greatly.22 There are periodic fee
structures, such as subscription and per-period fees, that allow for multiple
transfers under a single fee ranging from $5 to $8.23 There are per-transaction
fee structures that charge a fee of $2 to $5 for each transfer.24 There are also
free models that do not charge a fee at all but instead encourage employees
to pay tips as high as $14 for each transfer.25 Occasionally, employer partners
subsidize the fees in part or in full. Consequently, the fees for any given
transaction can amount to an APR in the wide range of 70% to 470%,
depending on the program used and the timing of the transfer.26 Earned-wage
providers are typically reimbursed on the employee’s next payday through a
preauthorized electronic funds transfer (EFT) from their personal bank
account or, for some employer-sponsored providers, a payroll deduction.27
The timing and design of earned-wage programs have facilitated the
sector’s exponential growth. Marketed as the antithesis of the now-notorious
payday loan,28 earned-wage programs were a welcomed innovation in the
20

See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, PAYACTIV, https://www.payactiv.com/faq/
[https://perma.cc/9YHS-P2L9] (“PayActiv partners with employers to deliver financial wellness services
to employees. Employer agrees to offer PayActiv as an employee benefit. No integration is needed, as
the existing payroll and time and attendance system is leveraged.”).
21
See, e.g., How Do I Create an Account and How Long Does It Take to Get Started?, EARNIN
(2020),
https://help.earnin.com/hc/en-us/articles/213412127-How-do-I-create-an-account-and-howlong-does-it-take-to-get-started- [https://perma.cc/7BGJ-3ZVV] (explaining how this third-party
provider offers services directly to employees through the internet); see also Samara Lynn, Cash Advance
Apps Like Dave, Earnin See Use Surge amid COVID-19, ABC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2020, 10:05 AM)
https://abcnews.go.com/US/turn-payday-advance-apps-coronavirus-batters-economy/story?id=7011850
8 [https://perma.cc/N7QQ-KU69] (discussing Earnin and another third-party provider, Dave).
22
See infra notes 78–88 and accompanying text.
23
See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
24
See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text.
28
Payday loans are rapidly declining in popularity due, in part, to increased regulation, public
scrutiny, and shifts in consumer demand. See, e.g., Lisa Rowan, Nebraska Becomes Latest State to Cap
Payday Loan Fees, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2020, 10:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2020/
11/04/nebraska-becomes-latest-state-to-cap-payday-loan-fees/?sh=6fa1abb61150
[https://perma.cc/
KZU6-BRGV] (reporting that over 80% of Nebraska voters approved a measure to cap short-term loan
fees at 36%, joining a slowly growing list of states that effectively ban payday loans); PEW CHARITABLE
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oft-overlooked fringe financial marketplace.29 From an employee
perspective, these programs appear safer than traditional alternatives like
payday loans since they are marketed as inexpensive noncredit services.
From an employer perspective, these programs seemingly help reduce labor
costs associated with high turnover and low productivity amongst employees
who may be financially distressed, without a need to increase wages.30 And
from a regulatory perspective, earned-wage programs are still novel enough
in form that they have yet to be legally defined, creating low regulatory
barriers to entry that are uncommon compared to competing services.31
Unsurprisingly, the market for earned-wage programs has grown
rapidly over the last several years.32 While the precise size of the market
TRS., AMERICANS WANT PAYDAY LOAN REFORM, SUPPORT LOWER-COST BANK LOANS: RESULTS OF A
NATIONALLY REPRESENTATIVE SURVEY OF U.S. ADULTS 2 (2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2017/04/americans-want-payday-loan-reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LVU-5KJC] (finding
“7 in 10 Americans, Borrowers Want Payday Loans to Be More Regulated”); Payday, Vehicle Title, and
Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,382, 44,384 (July 22, 2020) (“Reports from several
States and publicly traded companies offering payday loans show a shift from payday loans to smalldollar installment loans and other credit products.”).
29
See, e.g., Chris Arnold, Walmart and Others Offer Workers Payday Loan Alternative, NPR (Aug.
16, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/16/639236531/walmart-and-others-offer-workerspayday-loan-alternative [https://perma.cc/CNE3-SSSB] (quoting proponents, including a small-business
owner and a director at the United Way, referring to earned-wage programs as “a good idea,” “gamechanging,” and “really exciting”).
30
See, e.g., Todd H. Baker, FinTech Alternatives to Short-Term Small-Dollar Credit: Helping LowIncome Working Families Escape the High-Cost Lending Trap 56–57 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. M-RCBG
Assoc. Working Paper Series, No. 75, 2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/
mrcbg/files/75_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARZ4-H9CH] (finding that surveyed firms provided low-cost
income smoothing without significant credit risk to the FinTech firm or employer); Todd Baker &
Snigdha Kumar, The Power of the Salary Link: Assessing the Benefits of Employer-Sponsored FinTech
Liquidity and Credit Solutions for Low-Wage Working Americans and Their Employers (Harvard
Kennedy Sch., M-RCBG Assoc. Working Paper No. 88, 2018) [hereinafter HKS 2018 Study],
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/working.papers/88_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UJC5-55G8] (associating active use of earned-wage program with a 19% reduction in
employee turnover and an anticipated $110 million annual savings for employers).
31
For example, some earned-wage providers operate in states that prohibit substitutes like payday
loans. See Penny Crosman, A Payday Lender in Disguise? New York Investigates, AM. BANKER (Apr. 3,
2019, 9:03 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/a-payday-lender-in-disguise-new-yorkinvestigates-the-earnin-app [https://perma.cc/WL8F-FAHE] (discussing Earnin’s operations in New
York, a state that limits annual percentage yield rates to 25%, and describing how Earnin behaves as a
payday lender).
32
See, e.g., PayActiv Crosses $1 Billion in Processed Funds for Timely Earned Wage Access to the
Underserved and Underbanked Workforce, PAYACTIV (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.payactiv.com/
press/payactiv-crosses-1-billion-in-processed-funds-for-timely-earned-wage-access-to-the-underservedand-underbanked-workforce/ [https://perma.cc/47KG-NJ23] (noting that PayActiv has advanced over $1
billion to over 650,000 individuals); Cyrus Farivar, Millions Use Earnin to Get Cash Before Payday.
Critics Say the App Is Taking Advantage of Them., NBC NEWS (July 26, 2019, 3:41 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/millions-use-earnin-get-cash-payday-critics-say-app-taking-n1034071
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remains unknown, research suggests this is an impressive multibillion-dollar
industry serving millions of customers. The largest third-party provider
alone facilitates an estimated $2.5 billion in earned-wage transfers
annually.33 A handful of employer-sponsored programs facilitated more than
$9.5 billion in 2020, which was approximately a 50% increase from 2019
and 200% increase from 2018.34 These programs also boast partnerships with
thousands of firms, including large employers and human-resource
companies like Walmart Inc., ADP Marketplace,35 and, most recently,
Amazon.com, Inc.36 And the market’s growth has not cratered in the midst
of the coronavirus pandemic. To the contrary, one earned-wage provider
more than doubled its employer partnerships during the five months of
March to August in 2020, as compared to the entire year of 2019.37 Another
provider reported a 400% increase in users in the early months of the
pandemic.38 Earned-wage providers are also seeking to expand beyond
predominately low-income employees to white-collar employees.39
[https://perma.cc/2NTV-KGLX] (“Since 2015, the analysis firm Apptopia estimates that [Earnin] has
been downloaded more than 12 million times. More than half of those downloads came within the last
year.”).
33
See Farivar, supra note 32 (“Earnin does not publicly disclose how much money it processes, but
screenshots of an internal analytics website shared with NBC News by a current employee earlier this
month show that the company moves an average of over $212 million a month.”).
34
LESLIE PARRISH, AITE GRP., MAKING ENDS MEET: ON-DEMAND PAY AND EMPLOYER-BASED
LOANS 3, 17 (2021), https://aitegroup.com/report/making-ends-meet-demand-pay-and-employer-basedloans [https://perma.cc/7T2J-SX56].
35
ADP Marketplace offers human-capital-management solutions to over 860,000 employers
representing approximately 37 million employees. Corporate Overview, ADP (Oct. 2020),
https://www.adp.com/~/media/Corporate%20Overview/ADP-Corporate-Overview.ashx [https://perma.
cc/5Q73-L5XQ].
36
Lauren Kaori Gurley, Amazon Launches Payday Advances for Its Most Precarious Warehouse
Workers, VICE (Oct. 15, 2020, 10:42 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/93w95d/amazon-launchespayday-advances-for-its-most-precarious-warehouse-workers [https://perma.cc/FQ9T-C7XY] (reporting
that Amazon is now offering an earned-wage program called Anytime Pay to low-wage warehouse
workers).
37
Tara Siegel Bernard, Apps Will Get You Paid Early, for a Price, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/your-money/cash-advance-apps-paychecks.html
[https://perma.cc/VX2U-KL64] (“In recent months, hundreds of companies—including Kroger, Wayfair,
Dollar Tree, Staffmark, HCA Healthcare and Mercy Hospitals—have begun offering the apps to
employees.”).
38
Id.
39
Chris Opfer, ‘Early Wage’ Apps Aim to Disrupt Payday Loans, Two-Week Cycle, BLOOMBERG L.
(Aug. 1, 2019, 5:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/early-wage-apps-aim-todisrupt-payday-loans-two-week-cycle [https://perma.cc/6YSL-M4T3] (“DailyPay’s [Jason] Lee and Jon
Schlossberg, the CEO of Even, say they see the market also moving into the white-collar workforce.”);
see also Michelle Rafter, Increase Employee Job Satisfaction with Early-Pay Apps, PCMAG (Oct. 4,
2019), https://www.pcmag.com/article/371114/increase-employee-job-satisfaction-with-early-pay-apps
[https://perma.cc/R5RD-EQDN] (“At companies that give employees early access to their paychecks
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Yet, as the earned-wage market continues to pick up steam, it has
garnered critical attention from state regulators,40 policymakers,41 and
consumer-advocacy groups.42 Observers are increasingly suspicious of the
earned-wage market’s effect on employees like Jack and Jill. The primary
question raised is often a legal one: whether earned-wage programs ought to
be characterized as money-transmission services or loan services. If the
former, these programs align payroll processes with the ever-increasing
consumer demand for real-time transactions, albeit at costs borne by
employees that possibly reduce real wages. If the latter, however, earnedwage programs violate a host of state and federal consumer-protection laws,
including usury limits and uniform disclosure requirements. A federal class
action sought to answer this question,43 but a recent settlement likely will
delay any definitive conclusion about the applicable legal framework for
earned-wage programs.44 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) also recently weighed in with narrow responses. It issued an
advisory opinion that certain no-fee employer-sponsored programs did not
constitute loan services45 and granted access to the CFPB’s regulatory

through an app from startup DailyPay, 12 percent of those workers earn more than $100,000 per
year . . . .”).
40
See, e.g., Dean Seal, NY Leads Multistate Investigation of Payroll Advance Industry, LAW360
(Aug. 6, 2019, 8:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1185645/ny-leads-multistate-investigationof-payroll-advance-industry [https://perma.cc/5R6Y-KX4D] (announcing that New York regulators were
joined by nine states and Puerto Rico in investigating possible state lending-law violations by certain
earned-wage programs, including Earnin).
41
Yuka Hayashi, Pay-Access Apps Face Regulatory Test, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2019, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pay-access-apps-face-regulatory-test-11567416602
[https://perma.cc/
QL7X-8JYP] (discussing California’s efforts to enact unprecedented earned-wage legislation).
42
The author participated on a panel discussion titled “Early Wage Access: Costs, Benefits, and
Risks for Consumers” during the Consumer Federation of America’s Financial Services Conference
2019. See id. (reporting concerns from the National Consumer Law Center that the market may
“authorize[] a new category of payday loans that don’t have to comply with interest-rate limits”).
43
Complaint at 26–30, Stark v. Activehours, Inc., No. 5:19-cv-7553 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2019)
(claiming Earnin violated California’s Unfair Competition Law and Deferred Deposit Transaction Law,
among other state laws, and the Truth in Lending Act).
44
In July 2020, the lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed in connection with a settlement in a separate
lawsuit to which the plaintiff was an interested party. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion
for Final Approval of Class Settlement & for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, & Service Awards,
Perks v. Activehours, Inc., No. 5:19-cv-05543-BLF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2021).
45
Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Earned Wage Access Programs, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,404 (Nov. 30,
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_adviso
ry-opinion_earned-wage-access_2020-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B9P-LXWN].
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sandbox to one provider.46 But these actions left the question unresolved with
respect to the vast majority of the earned-wage market.
This Article, however, suggests that the current focus on whether
earned-wage programs are money-transmission or loan services, or
something entirely distinct,47 misses an even more fundamental inquiry:
whether and to what extent do earned-wage programs mitigate or exacerbate
consumer risks that have long plagued the payday-loan market. Consumers
who use payday loans have heightened risks of financial distress and
insolvency as compared to similarly situated nonpayday borrowers.48
Scholars often claim these risks arise from information asymmetries,
inadequate bargaining power, and cognitive limitations that are exploited by
payday lenders.49 In response to these risks, the literature regularly considers
solutions like disclosure rules and state-level consumer protections, which
have mixed results,50 and federal-level consumer protections, which have
been scant.51 In responding to this fundamental inquiry, this Article examines
the market not from the perspective of the supply side but that of the demand
46
BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROT., APPROVAL ORDER 1 (Dec. 30, 2020), https://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_payactiv_approval-order_2020-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL9UBGJ4] (approving Payactiv, Inc.’s application for access to the CFPB’s Compliance Assistance Sandbox).
47
Notably, several state legislatures have considered industry-backed measures to carve out distinct
licensing frameworks for earned-wage programs. See, e.g., Stephen T. Middlebrook, Earned Wage
Access Bill Introduced in South Carolina, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.
natlawreview.com/article/earned-wage-access-bill-introduced-south-carolina#:~:text=Earned%20Wage
%20Access%20Bill%20Introduced%20in%20South%20Carolina&text=With%20regard%20to%20Ear
ned%20Wage,on%20employer%2Dintegrated%20business%20models
[https://perma.cc/WGL9Y7VW] (discussing recently proposed South Carolina bill); Stephen T. Middlebrook, It’s a Jersey Thing:
Earned Wage Access Bill Gets Amended, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.natlawreview
.com/article/it-s-jersey-thing-earned-wage-access-bill-gets-amended [https://perma.cc/VNM6-HBPS]
(discussing legislative proposals in California, New York, and New Jersey); Kevin Wack, The Derailment
of California’s Payroll Advance Law, AM. BANKER (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.americanbanker
.com/news/the-derailment-of-californias-payroll-advance-law
[https://perma.cc/3WKP-56CD]
(discussing ongoing legislative battles about regulating earned-wage programs in California).
48
See infra Section III.B.2.
49
See generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19 (arguing that consumer-credit markets, including
the payday-loan market, require enhanced regulatory safeguards because of imperfect information
sharing, imperfectly rational consumers, and the reality that the “informed minority” of consumers cannot
alone drive the market).
50
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 647, 665–79 (2011) (discussing the prevalence of mandated disclosure rules despite their
shortcomings, which include consumer misunderstanding and information overload); Heather L.
Petrovich, Circumventing State Consumer Protection Laws: Tribal Immunity and Internet Payday
Lending, 91 N.C. L. REV. 326, 341–46 (2012) (discussing the reasons state law is inadequate in
protecting consumers from predatory payday-loan practices).
51
See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians
from Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649, 680–83 (2012) (discussing the failures of the
federal government to enact protections for consumers despite how necessary they are).
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side, disregarding the earned-wage program’s novel form and focusing on its
function to better understand and respond to its market effects.
In analyzing various earned-wage programs, this Article finds promise
and peril in this nascent and lightly regulated market. Although employers
may serve as promising gatekeepers to protect employees more effectively
from the market failures present in the payday-loan context, their
gatekeeping role may also impose material costs on consumers.52
Additionally, many earned-wage programs have features—such as relatively
high costs, limited underwriting, and credit invisibility—that are associated
with significant consumer risks in the payday-loan context.53 Yet, the
regulatory ambiguity of the earned-wage market means that employees are
left increasingly vulnerable to these costs and risks, but they are unable to
fully appreciate them. Such costs and risks are uncommon in traditional
money-transmission transactions, and, therefore, the legal framework for
money-transmission services neither contemplates nor mitigates them.
Accordingly, this Article argues that earned wage access programs have
varying effects, and in the absence of regulatory guardrails, some programs
can perpetuate, and sometimes exacerbate, the very risks providers claim to
eliminate when displacing short-term creditors like payday lenders. It calls
for a long-overdue federal framework for small-sum liquidity solutions that
contemplates the risky innovations of earned-wage programs but
accommodates a dynamic, national marketplace.
In doing so, this Article contributes to a nascent literature on earnedwage programs with an arguably more critical view of the market.
Contemporaneous scholarship by Professor Jim Hawkins has focused on
how the data-collection methods and novel features of earned-wage
programs allow providers to offer services that are superior to payday loans
primarily by eliminating the risk of high fees.54 However, by focusing on the
consumer effects and regulatory gaps associated with earned-wage
programs, this Article contends that these programs perpetuate not only the
risk of high fees but also the related risks associated with deferred
repayment, limited underwriting, and credit invisibility, which can lead to
financially deleterious debt cycles. It expands on Professor Hawkins’s

52

See infra Section III.C.2.
See infra Section III.B.2.
54
See generally Jim Hawkins, Earned Wages Access and the End of Payday Lending, 101 B.U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3514856 [https://perma.cc/NN2M-T6SH] (arguing
that earned-wage programs are substantively superior to and have the ability to displace payday lenders,
warranting a distinct regulatory framework that fosters the market’s growth but curbs risks of future
market abuses).
53
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assessment that earned-wage programs may constitute “credit” or “loans”
under existing regulatory definitions,55 demonstrating that the riskmanagement goals of lending laws would most effectively mitigate the risks
associated with earned-wage programs in comparison to other existing
frameworks. With some complementary but many substantively distinct
findings and proposals, this Article and Professor Hawkins’s work open a
dynamic conversation that encourages ongoing scholarship on earned-wage
programs.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I gives an overview of the
earned-wage market. It identifies the various business models, fee structures,
and payment mechanics used by the major market participants. It then details
the market’s impressive growth in five years’ time and the demographic
profile of its predominantly low-income consumer base, demonstrating the
importance of a scholarly focus on this emerging sector. The Part then ends
with a detailed explanation of why early adopters use or, for employers,
partner with these programs.
Part II focuses on the regulatory gray area occupied by earned-wage
programs. It identifies three potentially applicable legal frameworks derived
from money-transmission law, nonbank-lending law, and the novel federal
bank charter for nonbank financial institutions, known as the “FinTech
charter,” and describes their relevant benefits and drawbacks. This Part
highlights the fragmented nature of money-transmission and lending laws—
bifurcated between federal and numerous divergent state frameworks—
demonstrating that substantive consumer-protection regulations primarily
exist at the state level and under numerous idiosyncratic frameworks. It
explains that although the FinTech charter would preempt the patchwork of
state laws that may stifle a national earned-wage market with inefficient
compliance requirements, the charter fails to offer any consumer-protection
regulations and is questionably viable in the long term.
Part III argues that earned wage access programs have varying effects
that sometimes perpetuate, and in some instances exacerbate, the very risks
providers claim to eliminate when displacing short-term creditors like
payday lenders. The Part begins by describing the practical and legal
implications for the delayed-repayment mechanism in most earned-wage
transactions. It asserts that by commodifying the time value of money,
earned-wage transactions present consumer risks associated with
nonpayment, information asymmetry, and intertemporal decision-making
that are more common to the loan context than the money-transfer context.
It then offers case law to show how courts could find earned-wage transfers
55

See id. at 33–41.
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to constitute credit under certain lending laws. The Part lastly compares
earned-wage programs to payday loans to illustrate how several of their
similar features could exacerbate the risk of financial distress. It explains
how risks may be heightened in the earned-wage context due to opaque
pricing disclosure that inflates market rates and to employer-sponsored
models that may result in inefficient contracts, notwithstanding the potential
benefits of employer-gatekeepers.
Part IV discusses how the consumer risks associated with earned-wage
programs are currently unmitigated and require regulatory intervention.
Specifically, the Part highlights how money-transmission law is wholly inapt
to address the risks presented by the earned-wage market, how the
multifarious nature of consumer-protection regulation at the state level
would undermine the development of the market, and how the FinTech
charter is insufficient, demonstrating the importance of a novel framework.
Part V proposes a federal framework that would combine the consumerprotection regulations relating to service terms, which are common under
state law, with the benefits of federal uniformity. It concludes by considering
potential counterpositions, including state-level efforts to regulate earnedwage programs, and finds that the insufficiencies of state law combined with
the need for nationwide business models bolster the attractiveness of the
proposals recommended herein.
I.

EARNED-WAGE PROGRAMS: A PRIMER

Earned-wage programs were developed by FinTech firms to
revolutionize the market for small-sum liquidity solutions previously
dominated by payday lenders and other high-cost creditors. Appearing for
the first time in the mid-2010s,56 this niche market has rapidly grown into a
multibillion-dollar industry. This Part provides an overview of the earnedwage program product and its market.

56
See, e.g., Evolution of Pay, PAYACTIV, https://www.payactiv.com/evolution-of-pay/
[https://perma.cc/L8VK-7F8E] (showing that PayActiv founded its earned-wage program in 2012 and
launched its first service in 2014); The DailyPay Movement, DAILYPAY, https://www.dailypay.
com/movement [https://perma.cc/WP47-GYLT] (showing that DailyPay launched its first service in
2015); Our Story, EVEN, https://even.com/why-even/our-story [https://perma.cc/MXA3-BRSA]
(showing that Even was founded in 2014); Sage Lazzaro, This App Promises Easy Cash, but It’s a
Security Nightmare Waiting to Happen, MEDIUM (Dec. 20, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/this-apppromises-easy-cash-but-its-a-security-nightmare-waiting-to-happen-9b5758f91d23
[https://perma.cc/
23QU-NKD9] (showing that Earnin was launched publicly under the name ActiveHours in 2014).
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A. The Product
Earned-wage programs are mobile- and internet-based services that
enable users instantly to access cash from their earned-but-unpaid wages.
This is accomplished by one of three methods. First, there are integrated
employer-sponsored programs where providers are given direct access to the
employer’s payroll system, enabling providers to automatically cull data
from payroll and time-entry systems to calculate wages accrued to date.57
Second, there are nonintegrated employer-sponsored programs in which
providers are sent copies of time-sheet records by employers rather than
having direct access to payroll systems.58 Finally, there are third-party
programs which do not partner with employers; instead, they collect records
from the employee.59 Such records include bank data, pay stubs, and, from
salaried workers, mobile location tracking data to confirm daily work
commutes.60
In each case, the program analyzes payroll data using various
algorithms to calculate the dollar value of accrued wages, often net of
estimated payroll deductions (e.g., taxes and garnishments), in a given pay
period.61 This value is the sole basis from which earned-wage programs set
permissible transfer amounts. Some programs allow users to transfer the full
amount of this value,62 while other programs set caps to avoid zero-dollar
paychecks at the end of a scheduled pay period.63 Some caps may be a
percentage of earned wages,64 while others are flat per-transaction or payperiod caps.65 The program does not consider existing debt obligations or
57

See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 20.
See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, EVEN, https://even.com/legal/basic-and-plus-terms
[https://perma.cc/NHR5-J649] (requiring documentation of employees’ hours worked during the wage
period in question).
59
See, e.g., Farivar, supra note 32 (“Earnin users verify their employment by sharing their GPS
location and allowing the app to access their bank account, to show that they are working regularly and
that paychecks are coming in. If the income is irregular, users may be asked for pay stubs.”).
60
Id.
61
See
Demystifying
Earned
Wage
Access,
EVEN
(June
17,
2020),
https://www.even.com/blog/demystifying-earned-wage-access [https://perma.cc/Y764-R3CA] (noting
that the program “limit[s] how much of the available net pay an employee can advance, which ensures
there’s a buffer for deductions and garnishments at the end of the pay period”).
62
DailyPay Frequently Asked Questions, ADP MARKETPLACE, https://d3bql97l1ytoxn.
cloudfront.net/app_resources/221925/documentation/719560_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C39Z-5PBG].
63
See Kauflin, supra note 8.
64
Pete Isberg, Early Access to Earned Wages vs. Payday Lending, BLOOMBERG TAX (Aug. 26, 2019,
4:01 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/payroll/early-access-to-earned-wages-vs-payday-lending
[https://perma.cc/XX2N-GKWV].
65
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, EVEN, https://even.com/faq [https://perma.cc/NS8SCKBP] (stating that Even app users can take out up to 50% of their earnings at that point in the pay
58
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credit score when setting transfer amounts. And such amounts can be near
instantly available in a user’s bank account, payroll card, prepaid debit card,
or bill-pay recipient.66
The funding source of earned-wage transfers are primarily the FinTech
providers67 and, in a minority of cases, the employers.68 Earned-wage
providers are fully reimbursed for transfers via automatic deductions that are
assessed on the user’s wages on the user’s standard payday. 69 For some
employer-sponsored programs, the employer facilitates reimbursement
through a payroll deduction before transferring the balance of net wages to
the employee.70 Other programs may require the employee to set up direct
deposit with a bank account71 or reloadable debit card72 issued by the program
provider. That account is then automatically debited on the user’s payday to
reimburse the earned-wage program before making the balance of the direct
period); How Much Money Can I Cash Out with Earnin?, EARNIN, https://help.earnin.com/hc/enus/articles/223440348-How-much-money-can-I-cash-out-with-Earnin- [https://perma.cc/VM5N-72VN]
(showing that Earnin has a $100–$500 pay-period max).
66
See, e.g., DailyPay Instant Access to Earned Wages, ADP MARKETPLACE, https://apps.adp.com/
en-US/apps/221925/dailypay-instant-access-to-earned-wages [https://perma.cc/S5LJ-ST6C] (allowing
employees to “transfer and receive their earnings immediately in their designated bank account or on any
debit card or pay card”). Earned-wage providers often partner with credit-card-network providers to
facilitate such real-time payment transfers. See, e.g., Immediate Announces New Integration with Visa
Making Earned Wages Available to Workers in Real-Time, IMMEDIATE (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/immediate-announces-new-integration-with-visa-makingearned-wages-available-to-workers-in-real-time-301132336.html
[https://perma.cc/2MPG-SUPL]
(announcing the partnership between Visa and Immediate, a financial wellness company, which uses Visa
Direct for its earned wage access services); Michael Moeser, Clair Teams with Mastercard to Expand
Earned Wage Access, PAYMENTSSOURCE (Feb. 9, 2021, 9:00 AM) https://www.paymentssource.com/
news/clair-teams-with-mastercard-to-expand-earned-wage-access
[https://perma.cc/EH5R-4WMJ]
(reporting the partnership between Mastercard and Clair to facilitate the latter’s earned wage access
services).
67
See HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30 (“PayActiv is reimbursed by the employer by deduction from
the employee’s next paycheck.”).
68
Eric Dresdale, Giving Employees Early Access to Their Earned Wages, PAYMENTS J. (Nov. 29,
2017), https://www.paymentsjournal.com/giving-employees-early-access-earned-wages/ [https://perma.
cc/9ZUU-CFRX].
69
Id.
70
See HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30 (“PayActiv is reimbursed by the employer by deduction from
the employee’s next paycheck.”).
71
See, e.g., Terms and Privacy, DAILYPAY, https://www.dailypay.com/legal/#terms-of-use
[https://perma.cc/9Z2K-P5CV] (“You will receive a DailyPay Routing and Account Number from us for
an account that we establish for your participation in the DailyPay Program. You agree to make direct
deposit arrangements with the Hiring Entity using your DailyPay Routing and Account Number as the
account of record in the Hiring Entity’s payment system. You agree to instruct the Hiring Entity to direct
all of your net regular pay to that account, and you authorize us to convey such instructions to the Hiring
Entity on your behalf.”).
72
See, e.g., Gurley, supra note 36.
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deposit available to the employee.73 For third-party programs, the user
facilitates reimbursement on the user’s next payday via a preauthorized EFT
from a linked, third-party bank account.74 The reimbursement obligation is
often not legally compelled, since many providers consider earned-wage
transfers nonrecourse obligations.75 However, some providers, such as
DailyPay, make payroll deductions or preauthorized debits effectively
irrevocable.76 Other providers give users the right to revoke and delay
authorizations, but users never exercise it.77
Users and their employers have four different fee structures in earnedwage programs to consider.78 First, there are per-transaction fees ranging
from $1.99 to $5, which can vary based on the desired speed of the transfer.79
Second, there are per-pay-period fees requiring a single charge of, in some
instances, around $5, which allows multiple transfers within one pay
period.80 Third, there are subscription fees, which range from $6 to $8 per
month and incur a single monthly charge for multiple transfers within the

73

See, e.g., Terms and Privacy, supra note 71.
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65 (explaining that “either a deduction will come
out of your next paycheck for the amount of the Instapay OR your connected bank account will be debited
for that amount on your next payday”); Terms and Privacy, EARNIN, https://earnin.com/privacyandterms
[https://perma.cc/JR25-FAGJ]; How Does the App Work?, EARNIN, https://help.earnin.com/hc/enus/articles/213412087-How-does-the-app-work- [https://perma.cc/T7JR-D2C7] (instructing Earnin users
to send earnings by sending an electronic timesheet or add earnings automatically via the app’s Automatic
Earnings feature).
75
An obligation is “nonrecourse” when the obligee is barred from taking legal action to collect any
of the obligor’s assets in the event of a default. See Hayashi, supra note 41; see, e.g., Terms and Privacy,
supra note 74 (“We will have no legal or contractual claim or remedy against you based on your failure
to repay . . . .”); Terms and Privacy, supra note 71 (“Our right to receive your Daily Earnings is nonrecourse.”); Branch Terms of Service, BRANCH (Feb. 2021), https://www.branchapp.com/terms
[https://perma.cc/JBH7-TFB5] (“Branch will not . . . engage in debt collection activities related to an
[earned-wage access] that is not repaid . . . .”).
76
See, e.g., Terms and Privacy, supra note 71 (“You will not take any action or make any omission
(including redirecting payments, or placing or allowing placement of a lien or security interest on any
Daily Earnings) that has, individually or in the aggregate, an adverse effect on our ability to collect on or
retain any Daily Earnings . . . .”).
77
Hawkins, supra note 54, at 22–23 (discussing an interview with representatives from Even).
78
Fees are typically paid solely to the earned-wage provider. One can imagine a scenario in which a
competitive market will result in kickbacks to employers to incentivize partnerships, which would raise
significant labor-law concerns. Since such kickbacks do not appear to be the current practice, the likely
risks related thereto are outside of the scope of this Article.
79
See Frequently Asked Questions, DAILYPAY, https://www.dailypay.com/frequently-askedquestions/ [https://perma.cc/VZ8N-57C7] (“We only apply a small fee when you request money ahead
of your regular payday.”).
80
LESLIE PARRISH, AITE GRP., EMPLOYER-BASED LOANS AND EARLY PAY: DISRUPTION REACHING
SCALE 14 (2019) (reporting that PayActiv fees include “$5 per biweekly pay period of active use”).
74
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month.81 Subscription fee services are paid on an automatic schedule,
meaning that if the service is not used for two months, some providers will
cancel the automatic payments going forward.82 For employer-sponsored
programs, employers can cover or subsidize the fees.83 Some employers, like
Walmart, cover the costs for a limited number of transfers annually.84
Finally, there is a free service,85 which does not compel payment but
encourages users to “tip” the community.86 The program will provide tip
suggestions such as $9 for a $100 withdrawal, but users can voluntarily “tip”
any amount up to $14 for each transaction.87 Though “voluntary,” opting out
of a tip may result in more limited access, including a limit on the maximum
amount that a user can transfer.88
81

See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65 (“Instapay allows you access to wages you’ve
already earned, so you’re not borrowing. There are no taxes or interest - the only cost is our monthly Even
Plus subscription.”).
82
Juliana Feliciano Reyes, Why Some Workers Think Walmart’s Pay-in-Advance App Is a Lousy
Deal, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/walmart-pay-inadvance-app-fees-20180828.html [https://perma.cc/48DP-9ZNM].
83
See, e.g., HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30 (“According to [PayActiv], in over 50% of the cases the
membership fee is borne or subsidized by the employers . . . .”); see also Dresdale, supra note 68
(discussing the different payment models, which include mandatory employer payment (Instant
Financial), mandatory employee payment (DailyPay), and optional employer payment (InstantWage)).
84
See Walmart Offers New Financial Wellness Services for Associates Nationwide, WALMART (Dec.
13, 2017), https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2017/12/13/walmart-offers-new-financial-wellnessservices-for-associates-nationwide [https://perma.cc/G5G8-6VDT] (explaining that Walmart will pay for
employees to use an early wage access program up to eight times per year).
85
A recent trend that should be examined in future work is providers offering free earned wage
transfer services to users that elect to link earned-wage transfers to provider-issued debit cards, which
allow providers to generate revenues from interchange fees.
86
See How Does Earnin Make Money?, EARNIN, https://help.earnin.com/hc/enus/articles/223329928-How-does-Earnin-make-money- [https://perma.cc/PUP8-ZX6H] (“It is our
community members, however, that we truly rely on to keep the app going. Earnin is 95% communitysupported and mainly operates on the tips we receive from our community members.”).
87
See Steve Nicastro & Annie Millerbernd, Earnin App 2020 Review: Get an Advance on Your
Paycheck, NERDWALLET (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/earnin-personal-loanreview/ [https://perma.cc/FXD6-EWAA] (“Earnin doesn’t charge interest or fees. Users can donate an
optional ‘tip’ of any amount . . . . [up to] $14.”).
88
Complaint, supra note 43, at 23 (“[Plaintiff] believes that his limit was affected by the amount that
he tipped. For example, his limit was once decreased from $350 to $250 in a single pay period, which
followed a week when he had declined to pay a tip.”); Kevin Dugan, Cash-Advance App Earnin Changes
Its Tune amid NY Probe, N.Y. POST (Sept. 1, 2019, 9:29 PM) https://nypost.com/2019/09/01/cashadvance-app-earnin-changes-its-tune-amid-nys-probe/ [https://perma.cc/57MR-RJMQ] (reporting that
the pay-to-play feature offered “as much as 10 times more in loans to users who voluntarily tipped,” but
it was quietly disabled only after a state regulatory probe into possible violations of New York’s usury
laws and only for New York users). But see Why Did My Max Decrease?, EARNIN,
https://help.earnin.com/hc/en-us/articles/226633287-Why-did-my-Max-decrease[https://perma.cc/3XXP-V7AS] (“Tipping does not affect your individual Cash Out Max, whether you
decide to provide Earnin tips or not.”).
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While each fee appears low, when converted into an APR to compare
earned-wage programs to traditional loan products, earned-wage fees are
extraordinarily high. For example, the per-transaction fee models can result
in APRs between 145% and 365% or more if transfers are made closer to the
user’s next payday.89 Under the tip-based model, the $9 recommendation
results in an APR of 469% for a one-week advance.90 Even the more
affordable programs can result in APRs of around 73% with frequent use,91
which is more than double the rate of a typical credit-card service.92
B. The Market
1. The Providers
The nascent market for earned-wage programs has grown rapidly and
is occupied by several firms, including PayActiv, DailyPay, Even, and
Earnin. Firms in this market are typically nonbank entities and thus hold no
money for deposit.93 However, many are well funded through multimilliondollar venture-capital raises.94 Such funding has supported a rapidly

89
Notably, APRs are very difficult to pin down in this sector since it depends on the amount
transferred and the number of days left until the user’s next payday. This range estimate assumes a twoweek pay cycle and uses a $100 transfer with repayment in five days.
90
Kevin Dugan, Popular Cash Advance App Earnin Operating in Payday Loan ‘Gray Area,’ Critics
Claim, N.Y. POST (Mar. 21, 2019, 10:05 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/03/21/popular-cash-advance-appearnin-operating-in-payday-loan-gray-area-critics-claim/ [https://perma.cc/5G45-Q7TB].
91
This calculation is based on the Even app, assuming a bimonthly pay period and $150 transfers on
day five and day twenty-five with payday following five days after each transfer date. Because the $6 fee
is for all transfers in the month, the first transfer is effectively amortized—$150 is ultimately repaid in
twenty days at a $6 charge. COVID-19 Update: Get Paid Weekly with Free Even Plus, EVEN,
https://www.even.com/Walmart [https://perma.cc/T92S-38PV] (noting Even Plus’s subscription fee is $6
per month).
92
Lorie Konish, This ‘Deal’ Could Cost You 27.5 Times More Interest. Here’s What to Avoid When
Shopping This Season, CNBC (Dec. 24, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/24/deferredinterest-deals-and-store-credit-cards-could-cost-you-big-time.html
[https://perma.cc/5GR7-9WDU]
(“The average store credit card has a 28.86% APR, according to WalletHub. In contrast, the average
credit card APR for individuals with good credit is 20.94% . . . .” (citing Alina Comoreanu, Credit Card
Landscape Report, WALLETHUB (Oct. 17, 2019), https://wallethub.com/edu/cc/credit-card-landscapereport/24927/ [https://perma.cc/5PKP-QXYB])).
93
See, e.g., Lauren Perez, How to Get Your Paycheck in Advance, MAGNIFY MONEY (May 31, 2019),
https://www.magnifymoney.com/blog/banking/paycheck-advance/
[https://perma.cc/P9KY-4KD9]
(explaining that “Earnin is not a bank account”).
94
For example, Earnin has raised more than $190 million in venture funding. Earnin, CRUNCHBASE,
https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/activehours [https://perma.cc/LE8Q-JLW7]. DailyPay has
raised over $5 million. DailyPay, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/dailypayinc#section-funding-rounds [https://perma.cc/DE8G-77C5]. PayActiv has raised $20 million. PayActiv
Raises $20 Million to Expand Financial Wellness Offering for Millions of Financially Stressed Workers,
PAYACTIV (Oct. 10, 2018) [hereinafter PayActiv Raises $20 Million], https://www.payactiv.com/20-

1523

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

expanding market. Earned-wage providers have secured partnerships with
hundreds of thousands of firms, including direct partnerships with largescale employers like Walmart95 and Amazon,96 and partnerships with largescale human-resource management firms like ADP Marketplace,97 Paycor,98
and Kronos.99 Despite the market’s infancy, its activity is significant.
PayActiv has alone settled more than $1 billion in transfers100 with a monthly
transfer rate of over $100 million.101 One market-research firm estimated that
employer-sponsored programs collectively facilitated 18.6 million transfers
amounting to over $3.1 billion in 2018;102 this amount nearly doubled in 2019
and tripled in 2020.103 Third-party programs have had similar success. Earnin
has more than 10 million unique downloads104 and an estimated 375,000
weekly active users.105 And the market, although nascent, is dynamic, with
business models varying beyond fee structures and degree of integration with
employers. Earned-wage providers often offer users an array of financialwellness tools, including discount programs, personal budgeting strategies,

million-series-b-funding-expand-financial-wellness-offering/ [https://perma.cc/GHQ2-AB45]. Even has
raised $40 million. Kauflin, supra note 8.
95
Tergesen, supra note 5.
96
Gurley, supra note 36.
97
DailyPay Instant Access to Earned Income, ADP MARKETPLACE, https://apps.adp.com/enUS/apps/221925/dailypay-instant-access-to-earned-wages [https://perma.cc/2NH6-XTLW].
98
Mayuri Chaudhary, DailyPay Announces Partnership with Paycor, HR TECHNOLOGIST (June 20,
2019), https://www.hrtechnologist.com/news/performance-management-hcm/dailypay-announces-partn
ership-with-paycor/ [https://perma.cc/LEW7-EAN4].
99
Kathryn Mayer, Kronos, Even Partner to Offer Employees Access to Advance Payday, EMP.
BENEFIT NEWS (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.benefitnews.com/news/kronos-even-partner-to-offeremployees-access-to-advance-payday [https://perma.cc/YY8X-JXTY].
100
PayActiv Crosses $1 Billion in Processed Funds for Timely Earned Wage Access to the
Underserved and Underbanked Workforce, CISION (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/payactiv-crosses-1-billion-in-processed-funds-for-timely-earned-wage-access-to-the-underserv
ed-and-underbanked-workforce-300777678.html#:~:text=All%20Products-,PayActiv%20Crosses%20
%241%20Billion%20in%20Processed%20Funds%20for%20Timely%20Earned,needs%20without%20a
dding%20additional%20debt [https://perma.cc/CYJ8-HV6Y].
101
PayActiv Raises $20 Million, supra note 94.
102
PARRISH, supra note 80, at 22.
103
Bernard, supra note 37 (“Last year, workers tapped their paychecks through workplace providers
an estimated 37 million times, gaining access to more than $6 billion . . . .”); PARRISH, supra note 34, at
3, 17.
104
Dugan, supra note 90 (“More than 10 million people have downloaded the [Earnin] app since it
was first made available in 2013 . . . .”).
105
Kate Clark, Earnin Raises $125M to Help Workers Track and Cash Out Wages in Real Time,
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 20, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/20/earnin-raises-125m-tohelp-workers-track-and-cash-out-wages-in-real-time/ [https://perma.cc/8VK9-VKZK].
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and automated savings.106 Some partner with payment-service providers to
facilitate earned-wage transfers to reloadable debit cards.107
2. The Users
Data is scant for user demographics and transfer behavior. However,
the limited information available suggests the typical user is a low-income
individual who uses the service regularly for small-sum transfers.
Considering wages offered by employer partners, the average earned-wage
user’s income likely ranges from $20,000 to $30,000 annually.108 Average
users transfer $66 to $165, depending on the program, up to three times in a
biweekly pay period.109 Employees report using the funds to cover
nonemergency expenses, such as recurring bill payments, commuting
expenses, and food.110 Providers of earned-wage programs explicitly target
low-income individuals who rely on fringe financial services like payday
loans.111 While more data is needed on user demographics, the current data
is at least consistent with the intended target market of earned-wage
programs.

106
See, e.g., Kauflin, supra note 8 (describing the Even app’s three main features as “budgeting—it
links to consumers’ bank accounts, pulls in income and expenses, asks about upcoming bills and estimates
how much money they have left to spend,” “automatic savings,” and “a flexible-pay or ‘earned-wage’
option”).
107
See, e.g., Gurley, supra note 36 (“Warehouse workers who opt into [Amazon’s earned-wage]
program, by signing up for a pay card with the software company Wisely, will have to pay fees at out-ofnetwork ATMs to take out cash, and may be subject to other fines.”).
108
See McDonalds Full Time Salaries, GLASSDOOR, https://www.glassdoor.com/
Salaries/mcdonald-full-time-salary-SRCH_KO0,18.htm [https://perma.cc/SRA7-JTGJ] (estimating that
most McDonald’s workers make just over $20,000 annually); Cameron Albert-Deitch, Time for That Pay
Raise? Walmart Employees Now Make More than Minimum Wage, INC. (May 9, 2019), https://www.
inc.com/cameron-albert-deitch/walmart-employee-compensation-report-minimum-wage.html [https://
perma.cc/V9D6-8X6] (stating that the average full-time Walmart associate makes $14.26 per hour,
which, calculated as a salary for forty hours per week, is $29,660.80).
109
See Dailypay for ADP Workforce Now (Current) and ADP Vantage HCM & ADP Time-Clock
(Future): Frequently Asked Questions, ADP [hereinafter Dailypay for ADP Workforce FAQs],
https://d3bql97l1ytoxn.cloudfront.net/app_resources/221925/documentation/740545_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VZ6A-UGRV]; PARRISH, supra note 80, at 13–14 (discussing user data for several
earned-wage programs).
110
Rafter, supra note 39 (reporting that, according to a DailyPay executive, “the top four things that
people take money out to pay for are essentials that they might fall short paying for before their next
paycheck, including food, housing or rent, transportation or gas, and utilities”); see also Del Valle, supra
note 6; Tergesen, supra note 5 (stating that a customer reports “typically us[ing] PayActiv once or twice
per pay period, generally for bills due before her next paycheck arrives”).
111
See, e.g., Insights Team, The Truth About Payday Loans, PAYACTIV (June 13, 2019), https://
www.payactiv.com/blog/the-truth-about-payday-loans/ [https://perma.cc/K9T8-A8Y4] (comparing the
“vicious cycle and financial pitfall” that payday loans can cause employed persons “living paycheck to
paycheck” versus the “responsible financial practices” fostered by an earned-wage program).
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C. The Benefits
Preliminary research has found that earned-wage programs are win-win
solutions for employers and low-income employees. For employees, earnedwage programs help manage income volatility by providing near-instant
access to liquidity that would otherwise be held up by the employer until
payday. Historically, low-income borrowers have placed a high premium on
easy access to funds, flat fees, and privacy,112 all of which are provided by
earned-wage programs. So long as they have accrued wages, users are able
to access the programs and funds from their mobile devices at any time of
any day. Unlike some mainstream credit services like personal loans, earnedwage programs do not inquire about uses of funds. Users can quickly access
cash without needing to rely on relatives or turning to mainstream financial
institutions to resolve their financial shortfalls. Given that low-income
borrowers tend to distrust mainstream financial institutions,113 they may be
comforted by the fact that earned-wage programs are provided by nonbank
FinTech firms. In short, earned-wage programs appeal to low-income
consumers in many of the same ways that payday loans do.114 Moreover,
earned-wage programs in many ways offer significant improvements over
payday loans: they can be less expensive,115 they limit over-indebtedness by
allowing transfers of only accrued wages, and they offer tools that help users
self-manage their finances.116
These user benefits are then passed on to employers. Research shows
that workers who are financially distressed are twice as likely to lose more
than three hours per week of productivity.117 Such workers are also more than
112

GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA:
AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND 51–53 (2001).
113
See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND
UNDERBANKED
HOUSEHOLDS
4
(2018),
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/
2017execsumm.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9JE-HXM5] (“Almost one-third (30.2 percent) of unbanked
households cited ‘Don’t trust banks’ as a reason for not having an account, the second-most commonly
cited reason.”).
114
See Michael Kenneth, Payday Lending: Can “Reputable” Banks End Cycles of Debt?, 42 U.S.F.
L. REV. 659, 670 (2008) (“[A]pproximately 60% of customers cited the easy process for obtaining funds
as the most important reason for selecting payday loans over other potential sources of credit.”).
115
Baker, supra note 30, at 2; see also Tergesen, supra note 5 (“[A] medication technician . . . says
PayActiv has helped her avoid late and overdraft fees of as much as $80 a month.”).
116
Holly Johnson, Is Walmart’s Early Pay Offer Good for Workers?, POLICYGENIUS (Mar. 21,
2018),
https://www.policygenius.com/blog/walmart-offers-early-pay-feature-but-is-it-a-good-idea/
[https://perma.cc/97GT-XVBH ] (listing the pros of receiving an early paycheck, which include avoiding
more expensive loans and bank overdrafts and temporarily solving cashflow issues).
117
KENT E. ALLISON & AARON J. HARDING, PWC, EMPLOYEE FINANCIAL WELLNESS SURVEY 2017
RESULTS 5 (2017), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/private-company-services/publications/assets/pwc2017-employee-wellness-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3DF-C3TQ].
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twice as likely to switch jobs.118 The combined loss of productivity and lower
retention rates account for approximately 11% to 14% of a firm’s payroll
expense, or almost $500 billion for corporate America as a whole.119
According to the HKS 2018 Study, the regular use of earned-wage programs
is strongly associated with reduced employee-turnover rates and significant
cost savings for employers.120 And in recent market surveys of earned-wage
users, most respondents indicated that earned-wage access motivated them
to pick up more shifts and would be a key factor in their retention.121 Thus,
for the employer, earned-wage programs are a low-cost solution to labor
inefficiencies. This win-win result for employers and low-income employees
has reportedly led to some “employees rely[ing] less on payday loans and
bank overdrafts,”122 though precise numbers on such product switches remain
elusive. The growth of the earned-wage market stems not only from its
appeal to employers and employees but also, as is discussed next, from a
current lack of governmental regulation.
II. REGULATING EARNED-WAGE PROGRAMS
Currently, there are no regulatory frameworks for financial services that
explicitly contemplate earned-wage programs. Consequently, the market
operates in a regulatory gray area between the frameworks for moneytransmission services and loan services. Though some service providers seek
to create an entirely distinct financial service category,123 most have elected
to operate under the framework for money-transmission services. However,
money-transmission law imposes minimal restrictions on the service terms
offered by providers. Consequently, some lawmakers and consumerprotection groups argue that the more onerous frameworks for loan services,
like nonbank-lending law, are more appropriate. This Part gives an overview
of the three legal frameworks that potentially could apply to earned-wage

118

SALARY FIN., THE EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO FINANCIAL WELLNESS 16 (2019), https://resources.
salaryfinance.com/hubfs/Campaigns/USGuide19/Employers_Guide_to_Financial_Wellness_2019_Sala
ry_Finance.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y4D-3VW8] (citing HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30).
119
Id. at 4.
120
HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30 (noting that, according to one model, such cost savings could
amount to nearly $110 million annually).
121
New Study Reveals Strong Opportunity for Earned Wage Access, VISA (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://www.hrdive.com/spons/new-study-reveals-strong-opportunity-for-earned-wage-access/584917/
[https://perma.cc/NM4D-KCKB] (noting a DailyPay study which found that 56% of users reported being
motivated to pick up more shifts due to having access to their service and a Visa study which found that
89% of workers would stay longer at a company that offered an earned-wage program as a benefit).
122
Tergesen, supra note 5.
123
See Wack, supra note 47.
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programs: the relatively-light-touch money-transmission law, the more
onerous yet multifarious nonbank-lending law, and the nationally uniform
yet substantively hollow FinTech charter.
A. The Law of Nonbank Money Transmitters
Many providers of money-transmission services are nondepository, or
nonbank, financial institutions that perform payment services or facilitate the
exchange of funds between two parties. Western Union is the classic
example of a money-transmission firm, but FinTech firms have
reconceptualized the market to potentially include digital wallets like
ApplePay, peer-to-peer payment services like Venmo, and even
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin.124 The law of money transmitters is designed
primarily to protect consumer funds that are temporarily in trust with the
money transmitters,125 prevent money laundering,126 and safeguard consumer
data.127 It does so in a highly fragmented fashion, with regulation and
oversight bifurcated between federal and state laws. Such fragmentation
results in a multitude of idiosyncratic definitions of money transmitters,
compliance requirements, and registration or licensing fees.
1. Federal Landscape
At the federal level, the law of money transmitters focuses on
preventing money laundering and protecting consumers’ nonpublic
information. Money laundering occurs when a person or entity attempts to
conceal the origin of illicit funds through multiple complex money
transfers.128 Under the Bank Secrecy Act, money transmitters are required to
register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and comply with
regular reporting, monitoring, and recordkeeping requirements to diligently
124
See Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 113–18 (2013)
(discussing how many innovative payment services have remote risks of loss since fund transfers are not
meaningfully held in trust by payment intermediaries as in the case of traditional money transmitters like
Western Union).
125
See id. at 115.
126
See 31 U.S.C. § 5311; see also FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T
NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/fincens-mandate-congress
[https://perma.cc/7SPB-R2UP] (“The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 . . .
requires U.S. financial institutions to assist U.S. government agencies to detect and prevent money
laundering.”).
127
See Financial Institutions and Customer Information: Complying with the Safeguards Rule, FTC
(Apr. 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/financial-institutions-customerinformation-complying [https://perma.cc/ZG3J-NG3Z].
128
FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MONEY LAUNDERING PREVENTION: A
MONEY SERVICES BUSINESS GUIDE 2, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/prevention_gui
de.pdf [https://perma.cc/H85Z-EG3N].
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track sources of funds.129 The definition of a money transmitter under the
Bank Secrecy Act is broad,130 but the Act explicitly carves out exceptions
where the risk of money laundering is remote, such as, for example, when
the transaction is simple and easy to trace or the parties are otherwise
regulated. These exceptions include transmission services for the direct
purchase of goods and services and transactions between institutions
regulated under the Bank Secrecy Act and other heavily regulated entities
like securities brokers.131
Money transmitters are also subject to financial-privacy and datasecurity regulations. Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, money
transmitters must provide consumers with certain privacy disclosures and the
ability to opt out of information sharing.132 And in accordance with the
Safeguards Rule promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (the
Safeguards Rule), money transmitters must also establish and maintain
safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of consumer
information.133
Federal law is otherwise silent on consumer protection with respect to
domestic money transmitters.134 Some money transmitters may be subject to
certain disclosure requirements and compelled to assist consumers in
recovering funds in unauthorized transfers, but such requirements are
applicable only if the money transmitter stores consumer funds (e.g., prepaid
debit cards).135
2. State-Level Landscape
State law supplements the federal framework with consumer-protection
regulation designed to protect consumers against loss by combating fraud
and ensuring money transmitters are solvent. Money transmitters are
required to obtain a license in each state where they operate, subject to carveouts and exemptions determined by the definition of money transmission on
129

See 31 U.S.C. § 5311; 12 C.F.R. §§ 21.11, 21.21 (2004).
See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i) (2019) (describing any person that (A) “accept[s] . . . currency,
funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one person and the transmission of currency,
funds, or other value that substitutes for currency to another location or person by any means” or
(B) “engage[s] in the transfer of funds”).
131
Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii), (ff)(8).
132
15 U.S.C § 6801(a)–(b); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A); 16 C.F.R §§ 313.4–.9 (2016).
133
16 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2019).
134
The CFPB has amended the Electronic Fund Transfers Act with comprehensive consumer
protections for remittance transfers sent by consumers in the United States to individuals and businesses
in foreign countries. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1005.1, 1005.30–.36 (LEXIS through Fed. Reg. Dec. 10, 2020).
135
15 U.S.C.S. § 1693 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-220); 12 C.F.R. § 205.3 (LEXIS through
Fed. Reg. Dec. 10, 2020).
130
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a state-by-state basis.136 Licensing forces money transmitters to undergo a
vetting process that assesses, among other things, their financial
responsibility and experience, competence and character, and general
fitness.137 Licensing also comes at a significant cost, with money transmitters
paying an array of fees in each state where they operate.138
In addition to the licensing process, money transmitters must comply
with certain obligations to consumers. To ensure solvency, state law often
requires that money transmitters provide a surety bond, satisfy a minimumnet-worth requirement, and/or maintain consumer funds in a minimum
amount of permissible investments.139 Money transmitters may also be
required to file annual financial reports and submit to audits by state
regulators.140 Authorized distributors of money transmitters are often also
subject to regulation meant to prevent consumer loss.141 These state
requirements are reinforced by federal law, which makes it a criminal offense
to conduct money-transmission services without an applicable state
license.142
B. The Law of Nonbank Lenders
Some nonbanks specialize in lending rather than (or sometimes in
addition to) money-transmission services. Commonly known nonbank
lenders include payday lenders,143 but technological advances have expanded
the concept of nonbank lenders to include a host of FinTech firms called
marketplace lenders that offer mainstream lending services.144 The law of
nonbank lenders is designed to protect consumers against risks associated
with over-indebtedness, undue loss, and privacy breaches. As with money
transmitters, regulation of nonbanks lenders is fragmented across the federal
and state level. However, nonbank lenders are subject to considerably less
136
Tu, supra note 124, at 92. See id. at 86–91 for detail on the variance in state law definitions of
money transmission and exemptions.
137
Id. at 92.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 93.
140
Judith Rinearson, Regulation of Electronic Stored Value Payment Products Issued by Non-banks
Under State “Money Transmitter” Licensing Laws, 58 BUS. L. 317, 321 (2002).
141
Many states require contractual arrangements between money transmitters and authorized
distributors to compel immediate delivery of proceeds to the money transmitter. Id. at 322.
142
18 U.S.C.S. § 1960 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-220).
143
See Jayne Munger, Note, Crossing State Lines: The Trojan Horse Invasion of Rent-a-Bank and
Rent-a-Tribe Schemes in Modern Usury Law, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 468, 472 n.16 (2019) (providing
payday lenders, pawnshops, and rent-to-own stores as examples of nonbank lenders).
144
John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory World, 20 N.C.
BANKING INST. 17, 26–27 (2016).
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federal oversight than money transmitters and considerably more restrictions
on their terms of service.
1. Federal Landscape
At the federal level, the law of nonbank lenders focuses on protecting
consumers by regulating the process, or how loan services are offered.
Nonbank lenders are thus subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the
Safeguards Rule, as well as laws like the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),
which requires lenders to provide full disclosure of the total finance charges
and a calculation of the APR for each extension of credit.145 TILA was
intended to incentivize price competition not by setting rate caps but by
enabling price comparisons between substitute credit products that were
otherwise marketed along varying price schemes.146 Prior to its enactment,
the cost of credit was obscured by disparate price-disclosure requirements
across lenders, resulting in anticompetitive fees to consumers.147 TILA made
more clear the true costs of lending services across competitors, resulting in
a market-wide reduction in fees where the law was effectively
implemented.148 Other laws and regulations that affect the process of and
access to lending services include those that prohibit lenders from
discriminating on the basis of a protected class149 and those that compel
lenders to ensure the accuracy and completeness of information provided to
credit bureaus.150

145

PAUL BARRON & DAN ROSIN, 1 FEDERAL REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE AND MORTGAGE
LENDING § 10:7 (4th ed. 2020).
146
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-223) (“[C]ompetition among the
various . . . firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use
of credit. The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the
purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be
able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him . . . .”).
147
See Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated
Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1664–65 (2006) (noting that, prior to TILA,
consumers could not compare rates calculated by varying pricing methods because the process required
complex calculations, meaning that price shopping was difficult and lenders with the lowest rates failed
to effectively communicate those rates to consumers).
148
See id. at 1664–65, 1664 n.99 (explaining that TILA supplied information consumers needed to
compare loan prices and thus lowered transaction costs).
149
See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (implemented by 12 C.F.R. § 202(m))
(prohibiting discrimination with respect to a credit transaction “on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, sex or marital status, . . . [and] age,” the use of public assistance programs, or the exercise
of any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968).
150
Lender compliance is indirectly compelled via legislation that requires credit-rating agencies to
ensure consumer-credit reports are complete and accurate. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681.

1531

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Federal law rarely places limitations on the specific terms of credit
services, such as pricing, principal amounts, or collection terms. Indeed,
despite the CFPB’s broad authority to prevent “unfair, deceptive, or
abusive . . . practice[s]”151 in the provision of loan services, regulatory
proposals for small-loan services governing specific loan terms—i.e.,
service-term regulation—have faced significant opposition.152 CFPB rules
aimed at heightening underwriting requirements, restricting collection
practices, and limiting repeated use of loan services, were first delayed and
then significantly scaled down; yet, even the narrow rule that focuses
exclusively on collection practices continues to face legal threats.153
Moreover, the CFPB is expressly barred from regulating pricing terms.154
There are limited exceptions to this hands-off approach to service-term
regulation, including restrictions on wage assignments,155 maximum interestrate limits that are tethered to state-established usury limits,156 and usury
limits specifically for loan services to military personnel and their
dependents.157 Otherwise, the regulatory burden and oversight at the federal
level is relatively light for nonbank lenders.
2. State-Level Landscape
The light federal framework is nonetheless offset by the detail and
variance of state law, which leads the charge on consumer-protection
regulation related to loan-service terms. One of the oldest methods of
protecting consumers from lenders is through usury laws that limit the

151
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1031(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a);
see also id. § 1036(a)(1)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B) (making it unlawful for covered persons and
service providers “to engage in any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice”).
152
See Katherine Kirkpatrick, Andrew Michaelson & Steven Miller, Payday Lending May Face
Greater CFPB Scrutiny Under Biden, LAW360 (Feb. 8, 2021) https://www.law360.com/
transportation/articles/1349609/payday-lending-may-face-greater-cfpb-scrutiny-under-biden
[https://
perma.cc/HKH8-DBNW ] (summarizing the evolution of the Payday Rule, which was significantly scaled
back under the Trump Administration and currently faces two federal challenges).
153
See id.; see also Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 12 C.F.R.
§§ 1041.7–1041.9 (2020) (prohibiting lenders from attempting to debit repayment amounts from
borrower bank accounts after two failed attempts and requiring notice for certain debit attempts).
154
See 12 U.S.C. § 5517(o).
155
16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2014).
156
See Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968
(establishes criminal charges and treble-damage awards for interest rates on credit services that are twice
the legal rate set by applicable state or federal law).
157
Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (“[C]reditor[s] . . . may not impose an annual
percentage rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to the consumer credit extended to a
covered member or a dependent of a covered member.”).
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interest and fees lenders may charge for their loan services.158 Usury laws
initially operated to morally shame the practice of lending, but they were
later adapted specifically to stigmatize high-cost lending.159 Today, usury
laws are intended to protect unsophisticated and vulnerable borrowers from
unfair loan terms that lead to inescapable cycles of debt.160 Each state has a
usury statute, and no two statutes are the same. Interest-rate limits vary
significantly, as do the types of fees regulated by each usury statute.161 Some
states have no fee limits at all.162
Many states also curb risks associated with habitual borrowing by
restricting the number of high-cost loans that may be incurred within a short
period of time.163 States can even minimize the burden of loan agreements on
consumers by regulating terms like prepayment penalties164 and
amortization.165 In addition, states limit any undue risk of loss to consumers
in the event of default by regulating late penalties,166 the security that may be

158
See Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services
Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury
Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 657 (2000) (“Usury laws are, at core, the earliest form of
consumer protection law.”).
159
See Kirby M. Smith, Banking on Preemption: Allowing National Bank Act Preemption for ThirdParty Sales, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1631, 1642–43 (2016); see also John D. Skees, The Resurrection of
Historic Usury Principles for Consumption Loans in a Federal Banking System, 55 CATH. U. L. REV.
1131, 1140–48 (2006) (discussing the history and purpose of usury laws).
160
See Skees, supra note 159, at 1137–39; see also First Nat’l Bank of Ada v. Phares, 174 P. 519,
520 (Okla. 1918) (per curiam) (asserting that state usury laws exist “to protect those whom necessity
compels to borrow against the outrageous demands oftentimes made and required by those who have
money to loan”).
161
See CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N, GUIDE TO STATE USURY LAWS (2014), https://
www.cuna.org/uploadedFiles/Advocacy/Priorities/State_Government_Affairs/a-z_usury_lawguide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KZ9-NXBS] (displaying tables of the usury laws in each state); Lindsay VanSomeren,
Usury Laws: What They Are and Why You Should Care, CREDIT KARMA (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://www.creditkarma.com/personal-loans/i/usury-laws-what-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/
4WCL-S26U] (explaining that usury “laws are mostly regulated by individual states, which means they
can be drastically different depending on where you live”).
162
Richie Bernardo, Usury Laws by State, Interest Rate Caps, the Bible & More, WALLETHUB (June
20, 2014), https://wallethub.com/edu/cc/usury-laws/25568/ [https://perma.cc/292Z-ECT5].
163
COLIN MORGAN-CROSS & MARIEKA KLAWITTER, EFFECTS OF STATE PAYDAY LOAN PRICE CAPS
& REGULATION 3 (2011), https://evans.uw.edu/sites/default/files/public/STATE%20PAYDAY%20L
OAN%20PRICE%20CAPS%20%26%20REGULATION.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP2R-BM3H].
164
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5 (West 2020); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 22400(a)(2), 22400(c),
22402 (West 2020).
165
See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(1)(2)(c) (McKinney 2012).
166
Amy Loftsgordon, If I’m Late on Mortgage Payments, What Fees Can the Lender Charge?, NOLO
LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-fees-can-the-lender-charge-ifim-late-mortgage-payments.html [https://perma.cc/5A79-8ZLZ].
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taken for loans,167 collection practices,168 confessions of judgment,169 and
wage garnishments and assignments.170 In some instances, state efforts to
protect consumers against fraud, over-indebtedness, undue loss, and privacy
violations may be more restrictive for nonbank lenders that serve lowincome consumers, like payday lenders.171
Similar to money transmitters, nonbank lenders must obtain a license in
each state they operate in and comply with the oversight rules of the
respective state regulators. State licensing requirements vary, with some
states requiring a license for any consumer lending172 and others requiring a
license only for consumer lending at certain interest rates,173 principal
amounts, or for certain types of consumer loans.174 Many states have multiple
license categories based on the type or size of loans. The conditions of
licensing and ongoing compliance, including filing fees, recordkeeping,
financial reporting, disclosure, minimum net worth, and surety-bond
requirements, are similarly disparate.175 In sum, nonbank lenders with
multistate operations have the difficult and often costly task of monitoring
their compliance with many regulatory regimes.

167
Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect
on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 526 (2004).
168
Id. at 526–27; see also N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 422 (McKinney 2020).
169
Schiltz, supra note 167, at 526–27; see also CAL. FIN. CODE § 22331 (West 2020) (“No licensee
shall take any confession of judgment . . . .”).
170
See, e.g., Bradley A. Hansen & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, The Evolution of Garnishment and
Wage Assignment Law in Illinois, 32 ESSAYS ECON. & BUS. HIST. 19, 21–24 (2014) (exploring Illinois
garnishment and wage-assignment regulations).
171
See Kelly D. Edmiston, Could Restrictions on Payday Lending Hurt Consumers?, FED. RSRV.
BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV. 31, 32 (2011) (discussing “the high cost of payday loans, the tendency for
payday loans to contribute to consumer debt spirals, and the targeting of payday lending to financially
vulnerable populations” as justification for additional regulation of payday lending).
172
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.510 (West 2020); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 1140-13.010
(2006).
173
See, e.g., ROSS SPENCE, SNOW FOGEL SPENCE LLP, USURY AND HOW TO AVOID IT: IMPACT OF
NEW LEGISLATION ON COLLECTION PRACTICES 16 (noting Texas triggers its license requirement for
lenders charging interest rates above 10%).
174
See, e.g., Consumer Credit Licensing
Information, MO. DIV. OF FIN.,
https://finance.mo.gov/consumercredit/licensing.php [https://perma.cc/QJX5-R368] (explaining that
licensing is required for “retail credit institutions, motor vehicle time sales creditors, consumer credit
lenders, consumer installment lenders, lenders of $500 or less (commonly called ‘payday lenders’)”).
175
See, e.g., THE SUR. & FID. ASS’N OF AM., SURVEY OF BOND REQUIREMENTS FOR MORTGAGE
BROKERS AND LENDERS (2017), https://suretyone.com/pdf/all-bonds/mortgage-broker-surety-bondrequirements-state-by-state.pdf [https://perma.cc/AA4N-C44S ] (describing the variegated surety-bond
requirements for each state).
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C. The Law of FinTech: The FinTech Charter
Some nonbanks may avail themselves of another regulatory framework
designed specifically for FinTech firms. The law of FinTech seeks to
regulate certain FinTech firms like banks by eliminating the need for
compliance with differing state requirements in favor of more streamlined
federal-level regulation. Specifically, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) established a special-purpose national-bank charter (the
FinTech charter) for nonbank FinTech firms engaged in one of three
activities constituting the “business of banking”: taking deposits, lending,
and paying checks.176 The FinTech charter was intended to facilitate
innovative service offerings on a national scale, enabling federal-level
supervision and regulation similar to that enjoyed by national banks.177 The
charter focuses on firm solvency, systemic risks, anti-money laundering,
privacy, and credit risk management.178 While the specifics of FinTech
supervision remain vague, capital and liquidity requirements,179 financialinclusion requirements,180 and safety-and-soundness standards181 are
contemplated.
176
OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS (2018), https://
www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/pub-other-occ-policy-statement-fintech.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RLH2-GZ7K]; see also OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S
LICENSING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (2018), https://occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollerslicensing-manual/files/considering-charter-apps-from-fin-tech-companies.html [https://perma.cc/HV8RRHL6].
177
OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology
Companies, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (July 31, 2018) [hereinafter OCC News
Release], https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html [https://perma.
cc/XH67-DCA3].
178
See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FISCAL YEAR 2020 BANK SUPERVISION
OPERATING PLAN (2019), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2019/2019-111a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/257Q-26FU] (setting forth bank-supervision operating plan for fiscal year 2020). While
the specifics of FinTech supervision remain vague, the FinTech charter contemplates minimum capital
and liquidity requirements and contingency-plan requirements, which are intended to protect against
insolvency. FinTech firms would also be subject to narrowly tailored financial-inclusion requirements.
See OCC News Release, supra note 177.
179
See OCC News Release, supra note 177.
180
Id.
181
OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK
CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 1–2 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-andexamination/responsible-innovation/comments/pub-special-purpose-nat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DN6W-GRPV] (“Where a law does not apply directly, the OCC may, nonetheless, work
with a fintech company to achieve the goals of a particular statute or regulation through the OCC’s
authority to impose conditions on its approval of a charter, taking into account any relevant differences
between a full-service bank and special purpose bank.”).
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A FinTech charter would not single-handedly clarify whether moneytransmission or lending laws apply to a chartered FinTech firm. The charter
would, however, afford such firms the unique right to avoid the multitude of
idiosyncratic state laws under the money-transmission or loan-services
framework. Specifically, via the doctrine of preemption,182 chartered
FinTech firms could be able to export the usury laws of the state where they
are organized to any state where they conduct business.183 They could also
avoid state-by-state licensing requirements, process-specific regulations like
disclosure rules, and service-term restrictions like loan-to-value ratios,
payment schedules, and amortization.184 Escaping state-level regulations
would result in chartered FinTech firms being subject to very limited serviceterm regulations, in favor of more “light touch” or vague regulations, which
may not adequately protect consumers.185
*

*

*

As detailed above, earned-wage programs have in short order
established a multibillion-dollar foothold in the market for small-dollar
liquidity with minimal regulatory scrutiny. Proponents believe the “real
time” wage-transfer model to be a superior alternative to high-cost credit like
payday lending and an alternative that resolves employee liquidity crunches
while improving employer bottom lines. And, perhaps most significantly,
many proponents also believe this model to be legally distinct from such
credit alternatives.
Notwithstanding the benefits earned-wage programs promise, an
assessment of the market reveals risks that existing regulatory frameworks
prove inapt to mitigate. The basic transaction is in many ways eerily similar
182
See Michael Marvin, Interest Exportation and Preemption: Madden’s Impact on National Banks,
The Secondary Credit Market, and P2P Lending, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1807, 1811–14 (2016) (detailing
how and why federal preemption of state law works to allow national banks to comply with the pricerelated lending laws of only the state under which they are chartered).
183
Such flexibility was deemed necessary to facilitate the development of a “complex system of
modern interstate banking.” Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp.,
439 U.S. 299, 312 (1978). Congress extended the exportation right to state-chartered banks. Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 521, 94 Stat. 132,
164–65 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831d).
184
Preemption rights for national FinTech firms remain uncertain. However, if they are to be treated
like banks under the FinTech charter, these privileges are likely to be afforded to them. See generally
Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: How the Dodd-Frank Act
Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 1280–81 (2011) (explaining the OCC’s
enumerating lending regulations that would not apply to national banks).
185
See id. at 1285–86 (arguing that such light-touch regulation is easily subverted by national banks).
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to a payday loan, which has such significant consumer risks that payday
lenders have been labeled modern-day loan sharks.186 Payday borrowers have
struggled to manage household expenses, maintain bank accounts, and even
remain solvent.187 These harms have led nearly one-third of states and
Washington, D.C. to prohibit payday lending.188 Federal law bans the
issuance of payday loans to active military and their dependents.189
Moreover, the CFPB recently enacted federal-level rules to curb some of the
risks posed by payday loans offered to nonmilitary consumers190 and is
speculated to pass more robust rules in the coming years.191
Yet, earned-wage providers conveniently escape such rules and
restrictions, and the heightened burden of their fragmentation, by operating
as money transmitters. The question academics, regulators, and
policymakers must ask themselves is twofold. First, if payday lenders are
modern-day loan sharks, are earned-wage programs digital-era loan sharks?
If so, consumers may be unduly exposed to the same risks these
constituencies have endeavored to reign in for decades or worse—new,
unimagined risks not previously addressed in the law. Second, if there is
anything redeemable about the market, how should regulation be designed
to effectively and efficiently protect consumers while fostering market
competition and growth?

186

See Johnson, supra note 2, at 3.
See infra notes 275–282 and accompanying text.
188
Aliyyah Camp, Are Payday Loans Permitted in Your State?, FINDER (Apr. 27, 2020),
https://www.finder.com/payday-loans-in-your-state [https://perma.cc/39P4-4SSU]; see also Rowan,
supra note 28 (identifying the maximum allowed rate charged by payday loans per state).
189
See Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987; see also Aliyyah Camp, Can I Get a Short-Term Loan
if I’m Active Duty or a Military Spouse?, FINDER (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.finder.com/military-shortterm-loans [https://perma.cc/3X8E-X8G4] (explaining prohibitions on lenders making loans to military
members and spouses under conditions usually used by payday lenders, including high interest rates and
mandatory waivers of consumer-protection laws).
190
See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1041.7–1041.9
(limiting consecutive attempts by lenders to withdraw repayment amounts from borrower accounts).
191
See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman & Orla McCaffrey, Banks Brace for Tougher Rules Under Biden on
Consumer Protection, Fair Lending, WALL. ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2021, 11:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-brace-for-tougher-rules-under-biden-on-consumer-protection-fairlending-11612022400 [https://perma.cc/6P76-9N6P] (speculating that the CFPB under the Biden
Administration is likely to impose tougher rules on payday lenders, including revising the ability-to-repay
requirement that was removed from the Payday Rule).
187
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III. THE EARNED-WAGE PROBLEM
This Part addresses the first of these questions. Legal scholars are only
now beginning to critically analyze earned-wage programs. 192 This Part
identifies several risks of earned-wage programs by examining the key
distinction between money transmissions and loans, the shared features of
earned-wage programs and payday loans, and the practical effects of the
employer-sponsored model. In doing so, it argues that some earned-wage
programs can perpetuate, and in some instances exacerbate, the very risks
providers claim to eliminate when displacing short-term creditors like
payday lenders.
A. Deferred Repayment Risks
Unlike traditional money-transmission services, most earned-wage
transactions are marked by a feature that has historically been associated
with loans: deferred repayment.193 In transactions that defer repayment, the
192

To date, the only scholars who have engaged with this phenomenon in depth are the author and
Professor Jim Hawkins. See Hawkins, supra note 54. Another scholar has considered the programs as a
symptom of employers’ failure to pay wages more regularly. See Yonathan A. Arbel, Payday, 98 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2020). This work is at the intersection of two areas of legal academic literature. It expands
on the bourgeoning financial technology scholarship that assesses the disruptive market and regulatory
implications of innovative financial products. See generally, e.g., Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav,
Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019) (arguing that regulators are generally
only able to accomplish two of three goals—providing clear rules, maintaining market integrity, and
encouraging innovation—and proposing solutions to that “trilemma”); Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale
& Jennifer Chapman, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward
Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499 (2019) (examining the technological innovations of
FinTech firms, regulatory responses, and how to balance the benefits of FinTech against its dangers);
Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232 (2018)
(arguing that current policies and regulations are stifling innovation in FinTech); Christopher K. Odinet,
Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781 (2018) (describing how FinTech functions
and the consumer protections regulating the market). It also builds on the consumer-law scholarship that
assesses the market and regulatory effects of consumer credit for predominately low- and moderateincome consumers, which includes payday lending, title lending, and refund-anticipation loans. See
generally, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do Defaults on Payday Loans Matter? (Columbia L. & Econ. Working
Paper No. 509, 2014) (analyzing effect of failing to repay payday loans on borrower’s credit scores);
Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and
Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563 (2010) (examining attempts at regulation and consumer
misunderstandings about payday loans); Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link
Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361 (2011) (disputing the assumption that
“fringe credit” and financial distress are linked); Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains?,
102 J. FIN. ECON. 28 (2011) (examining the mitigating force of payday lenders after natural disasters and
property crimes); Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lender”—A Proposal for Candid
Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012) (arguing that municipalities
should require clear advertising of lending practices rather than eliminating payday lending altogether).
193
See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(j) (2013) (defining consumer credit,
in part, as a transaction to “defer payment of a debt, incur debt and defer its payment”).
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cost and benefit occur at different times. In the case of earned-wage transfers,
many programs float (or advance) funds to workers and are reimbursed at a
later date. Thus, as a technical matter, the benefit (instant liquidity) can occur
days or weeks before the cost (reimbursement from wages) is due.194 The
import of deferred repayment is that it results in repayment risks, information
asymmetry, and intertemporal decision-making.
First, deferred repayment transactions commodify the time value of
money, purporting to provide consumers with immediate use of their future
income while compensating providers for the opportunity costs of deferring
alternative uses of their own funds.195 These transactions optimally operate
as mechanisms for intertemporal and intrapersonal income redistribution for
consumers (i.e., a cash trade-off with your future self) but only to the extent
such future income contemplated under the terms of the transaction actually
exists.196 If such future income does not manifest and a consumer is unable
to repay a transaction on its terms, the deferred-repayment transaction can
result in providers extracting significant income and wealth from
consumers.197
Second, providers and consumers will ideally enter deferred-repayment
transactions when the risk-adjusted expected return exceeds expected
costs.198 However, there are unique information asymmetries that can arise
194
Many earned-wage providers might suggest this technicality is practically insignificant since they
float earned income rather than income to be earned in the future. As such, the transaction might more
closely mirror, for example, an ATM withdrawal after bank business hours or on the weekend. In such
instance, the ATM advances funds that are later settled during business hours. However, this view
assumes that consumers’ behavioral responses to the “settlement” of funds on hand (as in the ATM
context) will be akin to the settlement of anticipated funds (as in the earned-wage context). Also, the
settlement time in the earned-wage context can be significantly longer than in the ATM context, likely
contributing to a change in consumer behavior in such transactions. Finally, this view also assumes ATM
charges are above reproach. If consumers were compelled to use ATM services in a habitual manner at
the risk of financial distress, then the similar consumer effect would certainly warrant review.
195
Adam N. Hirsch, Getting What’s Due: Prejudgment Interest in Illinois, 98 ILL. BAR J. 412, 413
(2010).
196
See Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1147–48
(2019) (“A fundamental assumption of credit as a productive lever is that ‘[t]he borrower is borrowing
from her much richer future self—a future self who is made much richer precisely because of the
borrowed money.’” (quoting MONICA PRASAD, THE LAND OF TOO MUCH: AMERICAN ABUNDANCE AND
THE PARADOX OF POVERTY 238 (2012))).
197
See, e.g., id. at 1102 n.34 (describing how payday loans are designed to maximize profits from
the decision-making errors of economically vulnerable consumers).
198
See Thomas A. Durkin, Gregory Elliehausen & Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Credit and the
American Economy: An Overview, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 279, 280–82 (2015) (discussing how most
consumers decide to use credit to acquire assets—such as a vehicle or household appliances—that provide
value, or returns, over time that exceed their costs and lenders decide to issue credit when the expected
finance charge, or interest, earned exceeds the benefit of an alternative, immediate use of their resources).

1539

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

to the detriment of both the provider and the consumer to undermine efficient
markets. For providers, they may lack complete insight into the consumer’s
risk of nonpayment; therefore, they use various sophisticated tools to better
discern, mitigate, and price such risks, including consumer credit reports,
financial records, alternative data, and collateral. For consumers, they often
do not fully appreciate the costs of such transactions or the consequences of
nonpayment.199 Indeed, the comparative costs between two deferredpayment products often depend on sophisticated calculations involving the
deferred amount, total fees, and repayment terms that vary innumerably
between products. Consumers are often forced to rely on providers for clarity
on costs; yet, opacity tends to benefit providers who are enabled to evade
competing on price, resulting in inflated consumer costs.200 Similarly, the
risks of nonpayment or delayed repayment are left to providers to disclose,
but such terms are often not salient by design.201 In the absence of effective
information sharing between providers and consumers, markets with
deferred payments are ripe for inefficiencies that can undermine consumer
well-being.
Finally, even if information on deferred-payment products is effectively
disclosed, consumers will have to exercise intertemporal decision-making—
discerning tradeoffs among costs and benefits occurring at different points
in time.202 Consumers, however, often struggle to make optimal
intertemporal decisions, leaving them susceptible to anticompetitive and
predatory market forces.203 Specifically, consumers are often biased toward
the present, valuing instant gratification too highly in comparison to delayed

199
See Andrew T. Hayashi, Myopic Consumer Law, 106 VA. L. REV. 689, 691 (2020) (“Consumer
debt often has a complex fee structure, opaque repayment terms, and default consequences that are hard
to evaluate.”).
200
See, e.g., Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but
the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REGUL. 181, 192–98 (2008)
(describing the complex interest pricing that consumers face); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the
Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 811 (2006)
(describing the imbalance of access to information between lenders and “vulnerable borrowers”).
201
See, e.g., Renuart & Thompson, supra note 200, at 196–97 (discussing how complex mortgage
terms and superior lender knowledge regarding borrower default risk contribute to predatory lending that
pushes borrowers into default and foreclosure).
202
See Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge
Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 302 n.157 (2005) (“Delayed charges
that . . . are not apparent at point-of-sale, like many ATM fees, do not have the same effect on consumer
decisions as charges presented at point-of-sale, when the consumption decision is made.”).
203
See Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing,
2 AM. ECON. J. 193, 195 (2010) (discussing present-biased hyperbolic discounting in credit-card
markets).

1540

115:1505 (2021)

The Rise of “FringeTech”

gratification or subsequent costs.204 Such present bias can be particularly
acute for low-income consumers, who consistently face immediate and
urgent consumption needs while simultaneously balancing economic
scarcity against day-to-day survival.205 In such instances, demand for
deferred-payment products is often driven not by the costs for deferment but
by an immediate personal need for the underlying good or service ultimately
purchased.206 Such demand can also contribute to consumer failure to shop
for the least costly sources of credit, which leads to high-cost borrowing or
overborrowing, causing future liquidity crises as demonstrated in the payday
loan context.207 The disaggregation of costs and benefits in deferred-payment
transactions also increases the likelihood that a consumer may incorrectly
predict their ability to timely meet their obligation or to manage shocks to
their future income and consumption.208 Consequently, consumers are likely
to disregard, underappreciate, or miscalculate pricing, repayment, and
default terms, and therefore, such terms often warrant more direct regulation
than disclosure requirements.209
Irrespective of the form of the transaction, such disaggregation of costs
and benefits has long been the de facto marker of a loan with accompanying
loan-like risks.210 For example, when payday loans were similarly claimed to
204
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 36; see also OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT:
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 21–22 (2012).
205
See Shmuel I. Becher, Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Poor Consumer(s) Law: The Case of HighCost Credit and Payday Loans 15 (Univ. San Diego Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 18-357,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3235810 [https://perma.cc/NT6Q-ZFER] (discussing how scarcity
“directs people to further focus on present needs” in ways that are detrimental to their long-term interests).
206
See Hayashi, supra note 199, at 698 (“Preferences between goods and services at two different
points in time are governed not by market rates of return but by the preferences of the individual herself.
In contrast to preferences over cash flows, preferences over consumption at different points in time are
unique to individuals and the goods and services under consideration.”); Scott Andrew Schaaf, From
Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 344 (2001)
(“Consumers are often convenience driven, not price driven, when choosing immediate consumption over
delaying consumption.”).
207
See Schaaf, supra note 206, at 346 (describing overborrowing and eventual crises as loans
aggregate).
208
Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans, Uncertainty, and Discounting:
Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, and Default 2–3 (Vanderbilt Univ. L. Sch. L. & Econ.
Working Paper No. 08-33, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=1319751 [https://perma.cc/8NUX-YKGM];
Ronald J. Mann, After the Great Recession: Regulating Financial Services for Low- and Middle-Income
Communities, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 729, 746–47 (2012).
209
See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why,
127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1641, 1660 (2014).
210
See Hurt v. Crystal Ice & Cold Storage Co., 286 S.W. 1055, 1056–57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1926) (noting
that courts must “look beyond the form of a transaction” and determine that if there is a payment for “a
loan or forebearance [sic] of money, [then] the parties are subject to the statutory consequences, no matter
what device they may have employed to conceal the true character of their dealings” (emphasis added)).
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be mere money-transmission services, specifically check-cashing services,
courts relied on the inherent separation of costs and benefits in time to find
that they were instead loans subject to TILA.211 TILA’s disclosure
requirements are applicable to consumer credit, which is defined as “the right
granted by a creditor to [a natural person] to defer payment of a debt, [or to]
incur debt and defer its payment,”212 primarily for “personal, family, or
household purposes.”213 Another court noted that payday lenders were
“disbursing funds . . . on the promise of repayment of the sum plus the
‘service charge,’ at a later time. If this is not an extension of credit, this Court
finds it hard to imagine any transaction that is.”214 Even under state usury
law, transactions where payment is delayed or the issuer otherwise forbears
its right to collect payment constitute loans.215 Thus, it is plausible that a court
would find that the standard earned-wage transfer constituted consumer
credit under TILA or a loan under many state usury laws.216
But even for deferred-payment services that may be exempt from TILA
or otherwise carved out from traditional concepts of loan services—such as
bank overdraft protection and rent-to-own service contracts—the risks of
repayment, information asymmetry, and intertemporal decision-making are
well documented by scholars.217 Thus, any regulation of earned-wage
transfers should create safeguards to ameliorate these effects.
B. Payday Loans 2.0
While the deferred-repayment feature of earned-wage programs may
resemble loans generally, earned-wage programs also contain features that
more specifically align with payday loans. To appreciate the commonalities,
it is important to understand what this Article refers to when discussing
211
Lisa Blaylock Moss, Note, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions &
the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1737–39 (2000).
212
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(j) (2013).
213
Id. § 202.2(h).
214
In re Miller, 215 B.R. 970, 974 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997) (emphasis added).
215
See Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (2000) (“[The defendant]
must show that [the plaintiff] made ‘a loan or forbearance of money, either express or implied.’ By
agreeing not to cash [the defendant’s] checks until his payday, [the plaintiff] forbore its right to negotiate
the checks.” (citation omitted) (quoting Hershiser v. Yorkshire Condo. Ass’n, 410 S.E.2d 455, 457 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1991))).
216
For TILA purposes, the remaining open question would be whether the earned-wage provider
constituted a “creditor.” Because most providers offer earned-wage transfers as a core part of their
services offerings, they would certainly meet the definition. See Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646,
649–50 (9th Cir. 1974).
217
See Renuart & Thompson, supra note 200, at 185, 196–97; Natasha Sarin, Making Consumer
Finance Work, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1552–56 (2019).
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payday loans. A payday loan is an unsecured personal loan extended in
principal amounts that generally do not exceed $1,000.218 Each borrower’s
past pay-stub data is used to limit the principal of her loan to an amount not
more than such borrower’s typical wages in a pay period.219 Payday loans are
nonamortizing term loans, which means they are one-time issuances payable
in full with fees at maturity.220 Such loans mature within two to four weeks
on the borrower’s next payday.221 They are effectively secured by a postdated
personal check or EFT preauthorization, pursuant to which the payday lender
may unilaterally debit amounts owed from the borrower’s bank account at
maturity.222 Alternatively, a borrower can make the repayment in cash or,
subject to an additional fee, extend or refinance the loan.223 The median fee
for a payday loan and each related extension or refinancing is $15 per $100
borrowed, extended, or refinanced.224 Payday loans are typically issued
within minutes since lenders forgo in-depth reviews of borrower financial
records and credit data from mainstream credit bureaus for scant reviews of

218
Chris Cirillo, Payday Loan Regulation: Any Interest?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 417, 419
(2013) (“In a typical pay-day loan, a borrower borrows a principal of less than $1,000.”).
219
Hawkins, supra note 192, at 1394 (explaining the consumer paycheck is the cap on payday
lending).
220
See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA, REPORT 2: HOW BORROWERS
CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY LOANS 6 (2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2013/
02/20/pew_choosing_borrowing_payday_feb2013-(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/5NYF-EKTY] (describing
payday loans as nonamortizing loans).
221
What Is a Payday Loan?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 2, 2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-payday-loan-en-1567/
[https://perma.cc/E469255F] (“A payday loan is usually repaid in a single payment on the borrower’s next payday . . . . The due
date is typically two to four weeks from the date the loan was made.”).
222
See Kelly J. Noyes, Comment, Get Cash Until Payday! The Payday-Loan Problem in Wisconsin,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (“Payday loans are short-term loans in which a consumer receives cash in
exchange for giving the lender a postdated check or electronic access to the consumer’s bank account for
the amount of the loan and a finance fee.”).
223
See What Are the Costs and Fees for a Payday Loan?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 5,
2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-are-the-costs-and-fees-for-a-payday-loan-en1589/#:~:text=A%20fee%20of%20%2415%20per,Rollovers [https://perma.cc/T35D-LXKR].
224
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PAYDAY LOANS, AUTO TITLE LOANS, AND HIGH-COST
INSTALLMENT
LOANS:
HIGHLIGHTS
FROM
CFPB
RESEARCH
(2016),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/Payday_Loans_Highlights_From_CFPB_Research.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MGF-KVB7]; see also What Does It Mean to Renew or Roll Over a Payday Loan?,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 7, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-doesit-mean-to-renew-or-roll-over-a-payday-loan-en-1573 [https://perma.cc/4BHQ-9MH6] (“If you roll over
[a $300] loan[,] [for example], you pay . . . the $45 fee, and you have to repay the $300 plus another $45
fee [when the extension is over].”).
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nontraditional credit history, including repayment history for rent, utilities,
and other payday loans.225
Payday loans appeal to over 12 million consumers annually due to their
ease of access, transparency of costs, and speed of funds.226 However, many
policymakers, scholars, and consumer advocates fear payday loans create
more harm than good. Over the past two decades, legal academics and other
researchers have studied the effects of payday loans with varying
conclusions. Some find that payday loans are a “better than nothing”
liquidity solution with some positive effects despite their risks.227 Others find
that payday loans have net-neutral effects on borrowers.228 Still, a significant
body of work finds that payday loans exacerbate the financial woes of many
borrowers.229 In this latter group, most of the negative consequences of
payday loans are causally linked to or associated with three characteristics
of payday loans: their high costs that drain limited resources, limited
underwriting that results in repeated use, and credit invisibility that inhibits
access to mainstream services. Because the earned-wage market features
many of the same characteristics as payday loans, it is probable that the
market exposes consumers to similar risks.

225
See Johnson, supra note 2, at 9 (finding that consumers only need to present a driver’s license,
pay stub, bank statement, telephone bill, and checkbook to apply for a payday loan, and also showing that
payday lenders advertise that consumers can obtain loans in minutes, without hassles or credit checks).
226
See M. Ray Perryman, The High Costs of Payday Loans, PERRYMAN GRP. (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.perrymangroup.com/publications/column/2015/12/21/the-high-costs-of-payday-loans/
[https://perma.cc/R7LF-J846] (stating that many borrowers are attracted to payday loans because of their
ease of access); PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 220, at 4 (reporting that more than three in four
borrowers find payday loans appealing because they trust the lenders’ description of the product and need
a quick cash infusion).
227
See Morse, supra note 192, at 42 (noting lower foreclosures following natural disasters); DONALD
P. MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, PAYDAY HOLIDAY: HOW HOUSEHOLDS FARE AFTER PAYDAY
CREDIT BANS 26 (2008), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/
sr309.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PGW-USU8] (highlighting lower rates of bounced checks); Jonathan
Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household Survey Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon
Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 546, 553 (2010) (describing improved subjective assessment of financial
well-being); Neil Bhutta, Jacob Goldin & Tatiana Homonoff, Consumer Borrowing After Payday Loan
Bans, 59 J.L. & ECON. 225, 256 (2016) (arguing that payday loans reduce incidences of involuntary bankaccount closures).
228
See, e.g., Neil Bhutta, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loan Choices and
Consequences, 47 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 223, 223 (2015) (arguing that payday loans have little
to no long-term effect on consumers’ credit scores); Hawkins, supra note 192, at 1394–99 (discussing
tenuous link to financial distress due to limited principal amounts of debt).
229
See infra Section III.B.2.
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Similar Flaws

a. High costs
In comparison to mainstream credit options, such as credit cards and
unsecured personal loans, which have APRs between 15% and 35%, payday
loans are extremely expensive.230 The median payday loan fee of $15 per
$100 borrowed translates into an APR of 391% on a two-week loan.231 Some
borrowers report paying fees exceeding an APR of 1000%.232 As put by one
scholar, “[t]he U.S. market is missing several rungs in the lending ladder”
between mainstream credit services and payday loans.233 This wide gulf is
often explained as an inevitable consequence of high default risk and high
fixed costs notwithstanding the small sums of each of transaction.234 Some
observers, however, suggest the high fees are likely anticompetitive as
evidenced by the fact that pricing does not adjust based on changes in supply
or demand.235 Payday lenders tend to charge the highest permissible rate
established by applicable state law irrespective of market conditions.236 In
states that have no interest-rate caps, payday loans are the most expensive.237
A close look at earned-wage programs reveals they are similarly priced.
Ironically, the purportedly free service Earnin most readily demonstrates this
similarity. Earnin has encouraged its users to pay a $9 tip for a one-week
loan of $100,238 which would amount to an APR of 469%. Not only is this
rate comparable to payday-loan fees, but this rate is illegal in Washington,
D.C. and fifteen of the states where Earnin currently operates.239 Though
users can technically opt out of leaving a tip, the voluntariness of such fees
is questionable. In most other transactions, tips do not affect the range of
230
See
Bill
Fay,
Payday
Lenders
and
Loans,
DEBT (May
22,
2020),
https://www.debt.org/credit/payday-lenders/ [https://perma.cc/WJZ7-Z7N3] (comparing payday loans’
300%–500% APR with 15%–30% APR on credit cards and a 10%–25% rate for a personal loan from a
bank or credit union).
231
See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
232
See Alain Sherter, 1,000% Loans? Millions of Borrowers Face Crushing Costs, CBS NEWS (Apr.
25, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/1000-loans-millions-of-borrowers-face-crushing-costs/
[https://perma.cc/T446-MEXX] (reporting incidents of payday loans that carry an APR of more than
1,000%).
233
Jonathan Zinman, Consumer Credit: Too Much or Too Little (or Just Right)?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD.
S209, S212 (2014).
234
Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 864–65 (2007).
235
Id. at 883.
236
Id. at 882.
237
Id.
238
Dugan, supra note 90.
239
See Farivar, supra note 32 (“Payday lending is illegal in 15 states and Washington, D.C., but
Earnin operates nationwide.”).
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services available to customers. For example, being a bad tipper at a
restaurant does not mean you cannot order a steak during your next visit.
Yet, being a poor tipper as an Earnin customer has been found to limit the
amount of transferable funds and access to other services otherwise available
to the user. An Earnin user reported that he experienced a near-30% decrease
in available funds in a single pay period following a week in which he
declined to pay a tip.240 Earnin reportedly changed its algorithm for New
York customers in anticipation of an investigation by the New York
Department of Financial Services, but the change was not representative of
its nationwide business model.241
Earnin is not the only high-cost earned-wage program. The average
DailyPay user transfers approximately $66 1.5 times per week at a pertransaction fee of $1.99 or $2.99 (depending on the speed of transfer).242 Such
fees can in some instances amount to an APR between 221% and 330%.243
In comparison, providers like PayActiv and Even are relatively inexpensive,
though still above some state usury limits. PayActiv’s unsubsidized fees for
a biweekly pay period may amount to an APR of about 197%, and employer
subsidies could make the service even cheaper or free.244 PayActiv reports
that over 50% of its users enjoy programs that are subsidized in full or in part
by employers, although a more fulsome breakdown has not been publicly
disclosed.245 The Even app, which uses a subscription-based fee model,
would more impressively lead to average costs of about 73% APR for its

240
Complaint, supra note 43, at 23 (claiming available limit was once decreased from $350 to $250
following the user’s failure to tip).
241
Dugan, supra note 88 (“Earnin did away with the pay-to-play feature—which handed out as much
as 10 times more in loans to users who voluntarily tipped, according to internal documents and a source
close to the company—around the time of a March 28 subpoena from the New York Department of
Financial Services, according to sources.”).
242
Dailypay for ADP Workforce FAQs, supra note 109 (listing a $1.99 fee for next-day ACH
payment and a $2.99 fee for next-day instant payment).
243
APR is (i) the finance charge divided by loan amount, (ii) multiplied by 365, (iii) divided by the
number of days to repayment, and (iv) multiplied by 100. These calculations assume a biweekly pay
period with a transfer made five days prior to payday. This reasonably contemplates the 1.5-times-perweek transfers reported by DailyPay. See id.
244
This calculation assumes a biweekly pay period (which compelled a $5-per-pay-period fee under
PayActiv’s 2019 pricing model) with a transfer of $132 (to mirror DailyPay average usage) made seven
days prior to payday. PayActiv’s fee structures have, however, evolved significantly in recent months and
now include free offerings that instead rely on interchange fees if consumers use a PayActiv-issued pay
card. See PARRISH, supra note 34, at 11, 14 (“PayActiv charge[s] no fees to the employer or employee
for EWA deposits to the provider’s card—instead relying on interchange fee income generated from the
digital wallet into which EWAs are loaded.”).
245
HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30.
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average advance.246 However, the Even subscription charge raises a unique
concern in months when no transfers are made: what is the APR for a $6–$8
fee on a $0 advance?247
On the one hand, some earned-wage programs show promise to fill in
the pricing gaps that currently exist in the consumer-lending market.248 On
the other hand, some programs easily rival or exceed the costs of payday
loans notwithstanding potential market efficiencies, especially if users make
routine use of the transfers.
b. Limited underwriting
Unlike most mainstream credit services, payday lenders do not assess a
borrower’s ability to repay a loan by maturity. Lenders review recent pay
stubs to set borrowing amounts, but they do not confirm that future wages
will be similar through employment verifications.249 Lenders also do not
confirm whether borrowers will be able to repay the loan by maturity and
continue to meet their existing obligations. Such loans are based on the total
amount of likely earnings rather than disposable income. Thus, the single
balloon repayment at the end of the loan term often demands more of the
borrower’s funds than is sustainable.250 Studies suggest that borrowers are
reasonably able to contribute up to 5% of their take-home pay to service
payday loans,251 but payday-loan repayment schedules often demand more

246
This calculation assumes a bimonthly pay period and $150 transfers on Day 5 and Day 25 with a
payday following five days after each transfer date. Because the $6 fee is for all transfers in the month,
the first transfer is effectively amortized—$150 is ultimately repaid in twenty days at a $6 charge. See
Kauflin, supra note 8 (reporting that users take out $150 on average and pay $6 to $8 a month for access).
247
Notably, Even mitigates this concern by automatically unsubscribing users after two months of
no transfer activity. See Reyes, supra note 82 and accompanying text.
248
In doing so, earned-wage programs may also raise doubts as to prevailing notions of fairness with
respect to fees for short-term liquidity solutions. Since the lower fees remain above say an APR of 36%—
even with employer intermediation and subsidies, effective amortization through periodic fees, and lower
default risks and transaction costs—the market might be revealing the true costs that private solutions can
bear.
249
See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 12 C.F.R. § 1041.5(c)(2)
(2020); see also Pete Isberg, Early Access to Earned Wages vs. Payday Lending, BLOOMBERG TAX (Aug.
26, 2019, 3:01 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/payroll/early-access-to-earned-wages-vs-paydaylending [https://perma.cc/8X6X-DCHM] (“Some firms merely rely on consumer confirmation or
evidence of employment, such as a recent pay stub, instead of direct verification of available earnings
through the employer’s payroll system.”).
250
See Atkinson, supra note 196, at 1147–52 (discussing the pitfalls of credit as a solution to the
financial challenges low-income Americans face).
251
PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: POLICY SOLUTIONS 3 (2013),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/pewpaydayoverviewandrecom
mendationspdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ2C-YWSF].
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than 36% of the same.252 Consequently, most borrowers are left with an
impossible choice between timely repayment of payday loans and
maintaining household expenses.253
More than 80% of borrowers instead extend via “rollover” or refinance
their payday loans,254 choosing to pay additional fees until they have saved
enough to make the repayment in full. The average payday borrower makes
rollovers or refinances ten to twelve times annually,255 and the average $325
loan generates interest and fees totaling $520.256 Even borrowers who
ultimately default will service five payday loans before doing so, having
made interest payments equal to 90% of their original loan principal.257
In comparison, earned-wage programs offer slight improvements on
payday underwriting but suffer from a similar flaw that can result in
unanticipated costs for consumers. On the one hand, earned-wage programs
utilize advanced employment-verification tools to set transferable amounts
based on more precise estimates of future wages.258 Payday lenders issue
loans based on an assumption that the past pay stub is representative of future
work hours and pay rates—an assumption which can easily be upended if the
user suffers a reduction in work hours, a demotion, or job loss. In contrast,
earned-wage programs authorize transfers constrained by real-time
252
See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LOAN FACTS AND THE CFPB’S IMPACT 1 (2016),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2016/01/payday-loan-facts-and-the-cfp
bs-impact [https://perma.cc/3SUX-MR2R] (reporting that the average payday loan consumes 36% of an
average borrower’s gross paycheck).
253
See Lisa Blaylock Moss, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions & the
Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1742 (2000) (“The high rates alone contribute to
unmanageable levels of personal indebtedness among low and modest income households, sending many
desperate consumers into a downward spiral of indebtedness which ultimately forces them into
bankruptcy.” (footnote omitted)); CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE
FOR THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 14 (2004) (“[Payday loans are] a trap [some debtors] cannot escape
without missing rent, utilities, car payments, or food expenditures. These loans can create a biweekly
cycle of income and expenses leaving only enough surplus income to pay the most recent accrual in
interest and fees.”).
254
KATHLEEN BURKE, JONATHAN LANNING, JESSE LEARY & JIALAN WANG, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, OFF. OF RSCH., CFPB DATA POINT: PAYDAY LENDING 4 (2014),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_report_payday-lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKE6RMLD].
255
Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean Outrageous
Profits?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 217 (2007).
256
Adam Tempkin & Christopher Maloney, Expensive Loans to Desperate People Built this $90
Billion Industry, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 14, 2019, 7:17 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-02-14/expensive-loans-to-desperate-people-built-this-90-billion-industry [https://perma.cc/F7YYQU5Q] (quoting a senior research officer with the Pew Charitable Trust’s consumer-finance project).
257
Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 208, at 1.
258
See supra Section I.A.
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employment data evidencing actual hours worked and rate of pay.259 Thus,
earned-wage programs do a better job than payday loans at limiting a
consumer’s risk of unmanageable loss.260 On the other hand, earned-wage
programs similarly fall short of determining whether users can support full
repayment and their existing obligations. Neither the transferrable amounts
set by earned-wage programs nor reimbursements are limited to the user’s
disposable income. Affordability can thus only be presumed if users have
zero other expenses. In reality, full reimbursement can easily exceed 25% to
50% of payday earnings, which can severely inhibit a user’s ability to pay
existing obligations.261
Accordingly, it is likely that users of earned-wage programs will
repeatedly use these programs, just as payday borrowers do with payday
loans. Already, some users have been compelled to make back-to-back
transfers because they are unable to “catch up” the cash-flow shortfall in one
pay cycle.262 To the extent fees are incurred on a per-transaction basis, the
fees will have compounding effects similar to payday loans.263 Yet, as with
payday loans, first-time users may not fully appreciate the likelihood of these
compounding costs. To the extent fees are instead incurred on a periodic
basis, like a subscription fee, the compounding effect is somewhat
ameliorated since multiple transfers can be made under one fee like a line of
credit. In each instance, however, the impact will be a relatively substantial
drain on the already-limited resources of low-income borrowers.
c. Credit invisibility
Lastly, the effects of the high costs and limited underwriting attendant
to payday loans are exacerbated by the fact that payday borrowers are in a
perpetually weak bargaining position and lack access to low-cost
alternatives. Most borrowers lack meaningful access to mainstream credit

259

See supra Section I.A.
Cf. Hawkins, supra note 192, at 1394 (explaining that payday lending is often capped at the
employee’s biweekly salary).
261
See Dailypay for ADP Workforce FAQs, supra note 109 (“Employees on average will receive
51.9% of their paycheck on payday.”).
262
See Dugan, supra note 90; Sidney Fussell, The New Payday Lender Looks a Lot Like the Old
Payday Lender, ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/12/
online-banking-lending-earnin-tip/603304/ [https://perma.cc/5SSX-Y2Y3].
263
Cf. Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model that Encourages
Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 8–9 (2003) (noting that state legislatures allow payday lenders
to charge fees that reach high amounts when compounded).
260
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services because they are already highly credit constrained264 and tend to
have poor credit265 or insufficient credit histories.266 With limited incomes
that barely cover expenses, their dire financial circumstances often demand
expediency and simplicity in liquidity solutions, both of which are lacking
in mainstream services.267 Thus, payday lenders are their best, and often only,
option.268 With such disproportionate bargaining power, payday lenders are
not compelled to reduce costs or otherwise improve their service offerings.269
They are also not compelled to assist borrowers in accessing superior
alternatives. Such access would follow if payday lenders reported positive
repayment history to credit bureaus,270 but they do not. As put by one scholar:
A good credit record is like a coupon that borrowers can take to the
(conventional) bank to get a discount on their loan purchases. Fringe borrowers
with poor repayment histories are not directly nor immediately hurt by credit
reporting. They simply are not offered the coupon, and therefore they have to
keep paying the same high prices for their loan purchases.271

264
Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSPS. 169, 173 (2007) (“[R]elative to all
U.S. adults, three times the percentage of payday loan customers are seriously debt burdened and have
been denied credit or not given as much credit as they applied for in the last five years.”).
265
See Bhutta et al., supra note 228, at 233–34 (noting that payday-loan borrowers had average and
median credit scores below 520 versus the general population’s 680 and 703, respectively, and that
borrowers failed to secure credit from over five attempts in the twelve-month period prior to taking out a
payday loan); GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, AN ANALYSIS OF CONSUMERS’ USE OF PAYDAY LOANS 33
tbl.IV-8 (2009) (finding that 55% of payday borrowers had a credit request denied or limited in the
preceding five-year period and nearly 60% chose payday loans over applying for traditional credit
because they believed they would be denied for the latter).
266
Nearly 45% of individuals in low-income communities (with a disproportionate number being
Black or Hispanic) lack sufficient credit records to access relatively cheap credit from traditional financial
institutions. Kenneth P. Brevoort, Philipp Grimm & Michelle Kambara, Credit Invisibles and the
Unscored, 18 CITYSCAPE 9, 18–19 exhibit 5 (2016).
267
See Stegman & Faris, supra note 263, at 13 (explaining that research of California payday
borrowers found they preferred payday lenders to mainstream financial institutions because the former
provide easier access to cash; transparent fees; accessible locations; better treatment of customers; greater
trustworthiness; and better service because of the many useful products in one location, better hours, and
more Spanish-speaking employees).
268
See Gregory Elliehausen, Consumers’ Use of High-Price Credit Products: Do They Know What
They Are Doing? 34 (Networks Fin. Inst. at Indiana State Univ., Working Paper No. 2, 2006) (“The
decision to use high-price credit typically is a result of the consumer’s situation rather than a lack of
knowledge or information.”).
269
See THE YEARBOOK OF CONSUMER LAW 2009, at 162 (Deborah Parry, Annette Nordhausen,
Geraint Howells & Christian Twigg-Flesner eds., 2008) (discussing a lack of incentive to compete for
reasonable rates due to consumers’ unequal bargaining power).
270
Brevoort et al., supra note 266, at 9 (“Lenders use [credit bureaus’] records pervasively to assess
creditworthiness when underwriting or pricing credit.”).
271
Richard R.W. Brooks, Essay, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 1013 (2006).
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Likewise, earned-wage programs do not report reimbursement history
to credit bureaus, which might be expected since these programs purport to
be money-transmission services. It follows, then, that there is no debt
obligation being repaid. Earned-wage programs are instead services in the
cash economy, or at least that is how they are marketed. The reality, however,
is that the function of an earned-wage provider funding transfers and later
being reimbursed by the user is the quintessential function of any lender.272
Additionally, there is a slim risk of nonpayment such as by withdrawing
funds from accounts prior to scheduled preauthorized debits, terminating
employment, or, even more rare, revoking a payroll-deduction
authorization.273 Though low nonpayment risks are customarily tracked for
mainstream credit services, low-income users are unable to build credit via
liquidity solutions specifically tailored for them. As in the context of payday
lending, earned-wage providers operate to keep low-income users on the
fringes of the financial markets instead of fulfilling their promise of creating
a more equitable financial system.274
2. Similar Risks
The similar flaws shared by payday loans and earned-wage programs—
high costs, limited underwriting, and credit invisibility—extend beyond
being expensive and suboptimal in comparison to mainstream services.
There is substantial evidence that these features worsen the health and
financial conditions of many payday borrowers.275 In the payday-loan
context, high costs and limited underwriting work together to inhibit
borrowers’ ability to pay important bills.276 Specifically, access to payday
loans has been shown to increase household difficulties with paying
mortgage, rent, and utility bills.277 Payday borrowers are also more likely to

272

See supra Section III.A.
See Hawkins, supra note 54, at 40–41.
274
See, e.g., Our Story, supra note 56 (describing early-wage provider’s “mission of evening the
playing field for creating a better life”).
275
See Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday Lending Market,
126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 550 (2011) (“[Payday] loan access increases households’ difficulty in paying
mortgage, rent and utilities bills . . . . [and] increase[s] the likelihood of delaying needed medical care,
dental care and prescription drug purchases.”); Jaeyoon Lee, Credit Access and Household Well-Being:
Evidence
from
Payday
Lending
3
(Mar.
7,
2019)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=2915197 [https://perma.cc/KH92-XAB3] (finding that access to payday loans
increases suicide attempts by 10%).
276
Melzer, supra note 275, at 550.
277
Id. But see Morse, supra note 192, at 42 (finding that access to payday loans mitigates the
likelihood of home foreclosures and larcenies after natural disasters).
273
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close their bank accounts due to bounced checks.278 Other studies have found
that payday borrowers are associated with higher personal bankruptcy rates
than similarly situated nonpayday borrowers.279 Because the average person
who files for bankruptcy is just $26 per month short of meeting their
expenses,280 the compounded costs of repeat payday loans might be the
difference between solvency and bankruptcy for some borrowers.
Ultimately, payday loans can increase stress over financial circumstances
and decrease job performance.281 Indeed, the U.S. military observed that
payday lending decreased morale and readiness among troops,282 and in
response, Congress enacted a federal payday-loan ban to protect
servicemembers.283 It is likely that the high costs and limited underwriting
associated with payday loans have the same effect on civilian workers
though no similar federal ban exists to protect them.284

278
Dennis Campbell, F. Asís Martínez Jerez & Peter Tufano, Bouncing Out of the Banking System:
An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Closures 6 (Dec. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/a=1335873 [https://perma.cc/8ENN-DFW6] (finding that the presence of payday
lending is positively associated with bank-account closures). But see Bhutta et al., supra note 227, at 227
(finding that payday-loan bans resulted in increased incidences of involuntary bank-account closures).
279
See Robert Mayer, Payday Lending and Personal Bankruptcy, 50 CONSUMER INTS. ANN. 76, 76–
78 (2004) (finding that payday-loan debtors in Illinois, New Mexico, and Wisconsin declare bankruptcy
more quickly than nonpayday-loan borrowers); see also Donald P. Morgan, Michael R. Strain & Ihab
Seblani, How Payday Credit Access Affects Overdrafts and Other Outcomes, 44 J. MONEY CREDIT &
BANKING 519, 524–26 (2012) (finding that Chapter 13 bankruptcy rates decreased after payday-loan bans
were enacted while complaints against lenders and debt collectors increased); Paige Marta Skiba &
Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 21 (Vanderbilt Univ. L. Sch. L. & Econ.
Working Paper No. 11-13, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=1266215 [https://perma.cc/5RMW-8R3C]
(finding higher bankruptcy rates among individuals who took out payday loans); Noyes, supra note 222,
at 1645 (“Wisconsin consumer bankruptcy filings establish that bankruptcy petitioners with payday loans
go bankrupt sooner than other debtors . . . .”). But see ROBERT SHAPIRO, SONECON, THE CONSUMER AND
SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PAYDAY LOANS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 12 (2011),
http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/Report-Payday-Loans-Shapiro-Sonecon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88P7-EZWB] (finding higher rates of bankruptcy after payday bans enacted than when
permissive laws enacted); Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntyre, Explaining the Puzzle of Cross-State
Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367, 391 (2009) (finding that the existence of payday
loans has no effect on bankruptcy rates).
280
Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 167 (2014).
281
Scott Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military Personnel
Performance, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2805, 2808–09 (2014).
282
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF
THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 35–36, 45, 86–87 (2006).
283
See Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2018) (codifying that “[a] creditor . . . may not
impose an annual percentage rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to the consumer credit
extended to [armed forces personnel or their dependents]” and effectively banning the payday-loan
business model).
284
See Johnson, supra note 51, at 666–69.
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Moreover, by not reporting positive repayment history to credit
bureaus, payday lenders keep payday borrowers on the lowest rungs of the
lending ladder. Such failure to report payment history also has detrimental
effects on other aspects of payday borrowers’ lives. Credit reports are used
for a host of other services, including to price auto and homeowners’
insurance premiums, establish utility accounts, rent housing and set deposit
rates, and obtain employment benefits.285 Creditworthy payday borrowers
lose out not only on improved access to affordable credit services but also
access to more affordable goods and services and favorable employment
decisions.
Although extensive studies have yet to be conducted on earned-wage
programs, the documented effects of payday loans likely foreshadow the
effects of earned-wage programs because the two products share similar
features in function, if not in form. The HKS 2018 Study challenges this
position, suggesting that earned-wage programs are beneficial because of
lower relative costs for users and improved retention for their employers.286
However, the study was severely limited in three ways. First, its dataset was
limited to users of PayActiv, an earned-wage program with a periodic fee
structure that has many employer partners that subsidize costs.287 The study
did not consider the effect of all fee structures available to earned-wage
programs, many of which can result in significantly higher costs than
PayActiv. Earned-wage programs are not created equally and should not be
painted with a broad brush.288 Second, even with respect to PayActiv, the
limited price simulation compared an earned-wage transfer to a two-week
payday loan and a standard bank-overdraft transaction.289 The respective
costs were not discussed in terms of APR,290 which would better reflect the
comparative costs of a PayActiv transfer made just days before payday.
Third, the study did not directly consider the effect of long-term use on users;
rather, it determined long-term use resulted in reduced turnover rates for

285

Brevoort et al., supra note 266, at 9.
See HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30 (finding that PayActiv service fees were only 16.7% of
payday-loan fees and 14.3% of bank-overdraft fees).
287
See id. The other service the study examined was a “short-term installment loan” service, not an
earned-wage program. Id. For examples of PayActiv’s employer partners, see Improve Employee
Financial Wellness, PAYACTIV, https://www.payactiv.com/employers/ [https://perma.cc/52UG-6NV5].
288
See, e.g., supra Sections I.A, III.B.1.a (surveying the types and varying interest rates of earnedwage programs).
289
See HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30.
290
Id. (comparing respective costs in dollars, not APR).
286
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employers.291 The effect on employees remains an open question—one on
which the payday-loan market likely proves instructive.
C. Unique Market Risks
1. Inflated Pricing
While earned-wage programs share many of the same risks as payday
loans, they also pose risks unique to their transactions. For example, the
market for earned-wage programs has a heightened risk of inflated pricing
due to programs’ disparate fee structures. It is well documented that price
competition is inhibited when pricing disclosure is not uniform across
substitute services.292 This is because a mismatch in pricing units results in
the majority of Americans being unable to discern the most cost-efficient
options, thereby allowing providers to impose inflated pricing.293 And loan
markets with ineffective price disclosures are associated with a 2% to 4%
increase in loan costs compared to markets with effective price disclosures.294
The market for earned-wage programs is riddled with a variety of
pricing models.295 There are programs with per-transaction fees, per-payperiod fees, monthly fees, and even voluntary tip structures.296 None of these
models disclose prices in a manner that enables effective price comparison
across competing programs. The lack of uniform disclosure also inhibits
price comparison across would-be substitutes, such as payday loans,
291

The study merely speculated that employees using PayActiv may “be able to take steps over time
to improve their credit profile and rejoin the traditional financial system,” but it concluded “that active
use of the PayActiv product by an employee is associated with a materially lower turnover rate.” Id.
292
See Sovern, supra note 147, at 1663–64.
293
Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth:
Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REGUL. 181, 210 (2008) (noting that only 13%
of adults have sufficient quantitative skills to compare the relative costs of competing services when
computation is necessary).
294
See Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, How a Cognitive Bias Shapes Competition: Evidence
from Consumer Credit Markets 2–4 (Sept. 5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), https://pdfs.
semanticscholar.org/20d9/a6464fe71466fa4d149a5237079bd9fe8fae.pdf [https://perma.cc/68US-7Z2T]
(finding that “rates are 200-400 basis points higher” for loans obtained from nonbank sources). One
percentage point is equal to 100 basis points. See Simon Constable, What Is a Basis Point and Why Is It
So Important?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2013, 4:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324823804579017141254359828 [https://perma.cc/5NEN-TQWW].
295
See Mark J. Ricciardi, Is Payday the New Groundhog Day? What Bill Murray Can Teach
Employers About New Pay Apps, FISHER PHILLIPS (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.fisherphillips.com/pp/
newsletterarticle-is-payday-the-new-groundhog-day-what.pdf?28082
[https://perma.cc/EA7V-H348]
(discussing differences in fee structures); Chris Opfer, ‘Early Wage’ Apps Aim to Disrupt Payday Loans,
Two-Week Cycle, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 1, 2019, 5:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/early-wage-apps-aim-to-disrupt-payday-loans-two-week-cycle [https://perma.cc/6YSL-M4T3]
(discussing high pricing).
296
See supra Section I.A.
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overdraft protection, or pawn-shop services.297 Consequently, the earnedwage market likely suffers from inflated pricing because users are unable to
discern the most cost-efficient options and may inadvertently select more
expensive services. Some earned-wage users have already demonstrated the
danger of such opacity in pricing. On a service that purports to be free, users
voluntarily pay tips in amounts equivalent to payday-loan rates.298 Such
behavior is difficult to reconcile with anything other than an
underappreciation of the similarity in costs. This is particularly problematic
in the context of earned-wage programs since low-income users are already
cash-strapped. Consequently, inflated pricing can be the difference between
solvency and bankruptcy.299
2. The Employer Effect
The presence of employers as gatekeepers in the context of earnedwage programs could mitigate some of the foregoing concerns, but at what
alternative costs? Employers may be more objective and better positioned
than individual earned-wage users to negotiate optimal service terms. But
with the “salary link,” where employers automate repayment to earned-wage
programs via payroll deductions,300 employers also deprive their employees
of the autonomy to efficiently manage their own finances.
a. Benefit: employer-gatekeepers
Employer-sponsored programs promise to provide the small-sum
liquidity market with a rare demand-side gatekeeper: employers. Employers
may negotiate better terms than individual consumers because they are likely
more sophisticated shoppers and can wield the aggregate demand of their
employees in negotiations.301 Employers likely have the time and resources
to price shop more effectively than cash-strapped employees with limited
quantitative skills and impending repayment obligations. Employers are also
297
This Article conducts a comparative analysis between earned-wage programs and payday loans
because these two programs explicitly tie advances to wages and are otherwise unsecured, as well as
because providers in the earned-wage market explicitly sought to disrupt the payday lending market.
However, open questions remain as to how earned-wage programs fare in the broader market for singlerepayment liquidity solutions, which include overdraft protection and pawn services.
298
Farivar, supra note 32.
299
See Section II.A.
300
See HKS 2018 Study, supra note 30.
301
Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 881 n.57 (2013)
(discussing a policy that shifted retirement investment risks to workers as odd because the employer
“presumably was a more sophisticated investor (or had access to sophisticated investment advice) and
could secure economies of scale in managing that risk,” while workers “could be expected neither to be
sophisticated themselves nor to have access to the same quality of advice as would the employer”).

1555

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

well positioned to negotiate ex ante service terms—e.g., transfer limits,
repayment dates, and collection practices—that contribute to ex post
consumer harms. In sum, with proper incentives, employer-gatekeepers may
be able to protect vulnerable consumers from selecting unduly expensive or
risky earned-wage products.
b. Drawback: inefficient contracting
Despite the potential benefits of employers as gatekeepers, recall that
some employer-sponsored programs are reimbursed directly by the user’s
employer via a payroll deduction before wages are disbursed to the user. This
salary link enables earned-wage programs to offer near-risk-free advances,
which in turn allows for prices that can be lower than other short-term
liquidity solutions.302 The salary link effectively makes the earned-wage
transfer a nondefaultable debt, in that providers will get paid so long as the
borrower remains with the same employer.303 This payroll-deduction feature,
however, runs afoul of several principles of contract and wage-assignment
law that promote the efficient allocation of user resources.
Specifically, the salary link effectively collateralizes an earned-wage
user’s employment as well as a user’s interest in future employment, the
value of which is typically eight to nine times more than the principal amount
of the advance.304 Earned-wage users are thereby bound by the inflexible
pricing and repayment terms and would be, for example, unable to defer a
balloon repayment, even if only by a few days, to avoid a home-mortgage
default or to maintain utility services. Where payroll deductions are
irrevocable, either explicitly305 or in practice,306 a program user’s options for
resolving a cash shortfall are to request another transfer (possibly for a fee)
or to seek costly external credit solutions. Consequently, the findings of
reduced employee turnover under the HKS 2018 Study could be telling a
different story.307 Users may feel beholden to a job that never quite pays
302

Todd H. Baker & Snigdha Kumar, A Better Alternative to Payday Loans, WALL ST. J. (May 13,
2018, 1:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-better-alternative-to-payday-loans-1526233530
[https://perma.cc/54Q9-YJY9] (discussing how salary link allows for “markedly superior loan
performance, with default rates running at less than 20% the rate predicted by [traditional] scoring”).
303
Id.
304
Id. (explaining how earned-wage users “who would otherwise default decide against leaving a
job”).
305
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
306
See Hawkins, supra note 54, at 22–23 (noting that for one program, users may not be aware of
the right to rescind, which was supported by the fact that in the entire history of the business no user opted
out of the payroll deduction).
307
Additionally, this preliminary study analyzed the price and effect of two FinTech services:
SalaryFinance, an employer-based installment loan service, and PayActiv, a prominent earned-wage

1556

115:1505 (2021)

The Rise of “FringeTech”

enough as they endeavor to “catch up” to the reimbursement. The United
States has seen this risk realized in its extreme form in the context of the
company store.308 Indeed, the Supreme Court noted nearly a century ago,
“From the viewpoint of the wage earner there is little difference between not
earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor. Pauperism may be the
necessary result of either.”309 Anti-wage-assignment laws aim to prevent
such a result,310 but earned-wage programs subvert these laws. Ultimately,
the exacting terms of some employer-sponsored programs inhibit the
efficient allocation of user resources by inhibiting employees from switching
jobs when it best suits them or using their earnings to first pay obligations
with greater economic benefit, such as a mortgage or utility services.311
Thus, on the one hand, by adding employers as gatekeepers, employersponsored programs promise to improve the bargaining positions of
consumers toward their creditors. On the other hand, many of these programs
create a nearly-risk-free business model for earned-wage providers while
posing many risks to users. Such programs intertwine user choices regarding
employment and financial obligations in a manner that leaves users caught
between Scylla and Charybdis.312 The adverse effects on users are likely to
provider that utilizes the employer-sponsor model with a pay-period fee structure. HKS 2018 Study, supra
note 30. In relevant part, the study found that a $200 PayActiv transfer was approximately 85% cheaper
for users than an equivalent two-week payday loan or bank overdraft. Id. It also analyzed the effect of
long-term use of PayActiv, finding that employees who made two or more transfers had a 19% lower
turnover rate than employees who enrolled in PayActiv but failed to use it as much. Id. However, the
study’s pricing analysis is representative neither of the varied price structures in the earned-wage market
nor of the PayActiv user who takes out $200 just days before payday (rather than two weeks before).
Also, while the benefit of long-term use that can accrue to employers is an important contribution, the
study’s failure to assess the long-term economic effect on employees leaves open a critical question.
308
See William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age,
1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 796–97 (“Debts to the company stores fastened workers to the mines and
factories, and the stores’ monopolies enabled companies to charge above market prices for the groceries
and other provisions they supplied.”); see also Note, Payment of Advance Wages in Trade Checks on
Company Store, 40 YALE L.J. 1105, 1106 (1931) (describing employer effort to subvert regulations
intended to nullify exploitative company-store transactions by instead offering wage advances, which
operated as credit services but did not fall within the meaning of the regulatory restrictions).
309
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
310
Under federal law, wage assignments must be revocable, a preauthorized payroll deduction, or
already-earned wages. See Credit Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2014). However, state law is more
restrictive. Some states explicitly ban wage assignments except for employer advances. See, e.g., N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 195-5.2 (2020). Other states require notice and/or grace periods before deductions, cap
deduction amounts, and/or require that assignments be revocable. See, e.g., Illinois Wage Assignment
Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 170 (2020).
311
See Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency,
24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970).
312
In Greek mythology, Scylla and Charybdis were mythical sea monsters that were stationed on
opposite sides of the Strait of Messina. Each sea monster was a maritime hazard to passing sailors, as
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be compounded if, in reliance on their employers’ intermediation, users fail
to effectively explore more competitive third-party liquidity solutions.
D. Warning Signs
The above demonstrates that the answer to the opening question of this
Article is a disconcerting one. Recall Jack, who used an employer-sponsored
program with a monthly subscription fee subsidized by Walmart, and Jill,
who used a third-party program with per-transaction tips. The foregoing
analysis suggests that Jack is better off than Jill, who may be saddled with
snowballing expenses characteristic of existing credit products; but for Jack,
the benefit of his subsidized program costs him his already-limited
bargaining power. Their predicaments demonstrate how the average
consumer is not necessarily better off with earned-wage programs.
The earned-wage market’s biggest proponent is time because arguably
not enough time has passed to evidence the above scenarios. However, like
a canary in a coal mine, some early adopters have signaled the widespread
financial harms that could result from this marketplace. Two class action
lawsuits were filed in federal court in California against Earnin, a third-party
program provider. In the first case, the plaintiffs asserted that the exacting
repayment terms of the program result in burdensome overdraft fees,
notwithstanding the program’s insight into their insufficient bank account
balances.313 They alleged Earnin violated state law by failing to disclose its
repayment practices and the likelihood of bank overdraft charges.314 In the
second case, the named plaintiff asserted that he initially used the program
to overcome a financial rough patch, but “his initial use of Earnin began a
regular pattern of use” and “a cycle of advances that he has found difficult
to escape.”315 He also claimed he was unaware of the true cost of the “tips”
he paid to the program.316 He alleged Earnin violated various state laws and
the TILA by, inter alia, lending without a proper state license, engaging in
usurious lending, and failing to disclose the APR and the true “loan” nature
of its product to customers.317

avoiding one meant passing too closely to the other and the risks posed by it. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY
278–85 (Robert Fagles trans., 1996). The phrase “between Scylla and Charybdis” has come to be an idiom
meaning “having to choose between two evils.”
313
Complaint at 2, Perks v. Activehours, Inc., No. 5:19-cv-05543 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2019).
314
Id. at 3.
315
Complaint, supra note 43, at 22.
316
Id. at 23.
317
See id. at 24, 27–28.

1558

115:1505 (2021)

The Rise of “FringeTech”

A scan of hundreds of consumer reports suggests these plaintiffs are not
alone. Several consumers report having insufficient funds when repayment
was due, thus resulting in excessive overdraft charges.318 Other reports reflect
dependency on the transfers such that a decrease in the available transfer
amount was perceived as withholding their earnings or the customer
otherwise losing money.319 One user, ironically a debt collector familiar with
payday lending, viewed the earned-wage program as distinct from payday
loans and a harmless way to take out money. However, he found himself
regularly paying tips that amounted to an APR of 469%, in a $350 deficit
due to overdraft fees, and “dependent on [the program] to get [his] money
out before payday.”320
Multiple states are investigating the earned-wage market for possible
violations of state lending laws.321 Yet, these regulatory interventions are
moving, as they often do, slowly. And though the California lawsuits offered
an opportunity for legal clarity, their settlement indefinitely delayed answers
that would resolve the underlying uncertainty.322 In the interim, due to
shortcomings in existing money-transmitter laws, a growing number of
consumers are vulnerable to these outcomes as they rush to download thirdparty apps and their employers push such services as new employee benefits.
However, alternatively applying lending laws may leave customers
vulnerable to some risks unique to the earned-wage market and may unduly
stifle the market’s expansion even after given the proper guardrails.

318
While in some instances the repayment was prematurely withdrawn by Earnin, in many cases it
appears the consumer lacked sufficient funds when repayment was due. See Complaints: Earnin, BETTER
BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/us/ca/palo-alto/profile/mobile-apps/earnin-1216-642613/
complaints [https://perma.cc/6VRC-FL4G].
319
See id. One consumer noted: “My max was lowered this week again now to [$]200 . . . . [I]f I am
giving you 250 dollars and only being able to get [$]200 back[,] I’m losing money . . . .” Id. Another
consumer complained: “They abuse their consumers financially. They amp up the amount you can
[withdraw] and then on the next payday they reduce it greatly. I have been credited with [$]175 and on
my next payday [it] will be reduced . . . to [$]100.” Id.
320
Dugan, supra note 90.
321
Stephen T. Middlebrook & Tom Kierner, What Employers Need to Know About Advance Wage
Payment Products, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/whatemployers-need-to-know-about-advance-wage-payment-products [https://perma.cc/7NB9-KKR9].
322
See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement & for
Approval of Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, & Service Awards, Perks v. Activehours, Inc., No. 5:19-cv-05543BLF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2021); see also Emilie Ruscoe, Earnin Users Seek OK for $12.5M Settlement
Deal, LAW360 (July 28, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1295949/earnin-users-seek-ok-for-125m-settlement-deal [https://perma.cc/W67E-U9G8] (reporting that both California lawsuits are pending
dismissal subject to court approval of a $12.5-million settlement agreement).
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IV. REGULATORY SHORTCOMINGS
This Part begins the inquiry into efficient and effective regulation.
When treated as money-transmission services, earned-wage programs are
not effectively regulated to curb the risks described in the foregoing Section.
This Part demonstrates that the risks attendant to earned-wage programs are
in more ways explicitly contemplated by the regulatory frameworks for
lenders, both nonbanks and banks, than those for money transmitters. Yet,
even the laws applicable to lenders fall short of mitigating some significant
risks and operate to stifle expansion of the market’s more positive features.
This Part, thus, reveals that despite their undue risks, earned-wage programs
uniquely lack meaningful regulatory guardrails.
A. The Law of Nonbank Money Transmitters
As applied to earned-wage programs, the law of money transmitters is
a complete mismatch. The fragmented framework likely creates operational
challenges for earned-wage providers that offer services nationally.323 Yet,
the most significant flaw of this framework is that the law of money
transmitters focuses on risks that are typically not present in earned-wage
transactions and is not responsive to the many risks that do exist. To be sure,
federal laws such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Safeguards Rule
that both protect consumer data are appropriate in the context of earned-wage
programs,324 which collect personal employment records and even GPS data.
However, the remaining risks combatted by the law of money transmitters
are not significant in the context of earned-wage programs. Take, for
example, money laundering, which requires that an individual (or entity)
make a series of transfers to different parties.325 In contrast, most earnedwage programs facilitate transfers between up to three parties that are all
readily identifiable: the provider, employer, and user. It is nearly impossible
for users to launder funds through an earned-wage program, making any
emphasis on money laundering misplaced.
The risk of loss targeted by state regulation is also remote in the context
of earned-wage programs. In a traditional money-transmission service, such
as Western Union, the provider collects funds from a consumer who pays a
323
Benjamin Lo, Note, Fatal Fragments: The Effect of Money Transmission Regulation on Payments
Innovation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 111, 131–41 (2016) (“A nationwide licensing program could cost up
to one-third of the startup's available funds. Even worse, this figure simply covers application and
financing costs, and does not include legal fees and any other professional fees needed to meet licensing
requirements, such as developing an AML program or auditing financial statements.”).
324
See supra notes 132–133 and accompanying text.
325
See supra Section II.A.1.
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fee for those funds to be transmitted to another party or returned in a different
form (e.g., prepaid debit cards). In such instances, the state has an interest in
protecting consumers from losing their funds in the event the provider fails
to deliver according to the agreement after taking possession of consumer
funds.326 Indeed, providers could simply take consumer funds without ever
intending to perform.327 In contrast, earned-wage providers typically perform
first by transferring their own funds to users for later reimbursement.328 Thus,
the provider, rather than the user, bears the greater risk of loss in the
transaction. If the earned-wage program never pays, wages will simply be
transferred on each user’s regular payday. However, under business models
where earned-wage providers first receive funds from employers that are
later transferred to users,329 there is a stronger argument that state moneytransmission law applies. In these transactions, employers entrust funds to
earned-wage providers in much the same way as consumers do with
traditional money transmitters.330 Consequently, such earned-wage
transactions could result in loss to the employer if the earned-wage provider
is insolvent or intentionally fails to honor its obligation.
The gravest flaw is that the law of money transmitters fails to address
the main risks actually posed by earned-wage programs. The risks of loss
associated with earned-wage programs—i.e., the depletion of future income,
unduly punitive default risk, and difficult access to low-cost services—are
not contemplated by the law of money transmitters. Users remain subject to
high costs, underwriting policies, and repayment terms that make timely
repayment difficult.331 Accordingly, the law of money transmitters is a
mismatch for earned-wage programs.
B. The Law of Nonbank Lenders
The law of nonbank lenders more appropriately addresses the risks
posed by earned-wage programs. However, the most effective regulations
narrowly apply to lenders and loans. If earned-wage programs are in fact
money transmitters, many of these regulations—e.g., TILA, state usury laws,
and borrowing restrictions—do not apply.332 Moreover, the state-by-state
nature of lending regulation creates its own inefficiencies that can be unduly
326
327
328
329
330
331
332

Tu, supra note 124, at 115.
Id.
See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section I.A.
See Dresdale, supra note 68.
See supra Section III.B.1.
See supra Section III.A.
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burdensome for most earned-wage providers that offer services in multiple
states.
1. The Pros
The law of nonbank lenders contemplates many of the risks associated
with earned-wage programs. TILA was specifically created to remedy
inflated pricing that results from obscure and disparate pricing disclosures
that characterize the earned-wage market.333 If a law like TILA applied to
earned-wage programs, FinTech providers would be compelled to compute
their fees, whether subscription, transaction-based, or recommended tips,
into APRs or another uniform metric that could be compared across
substitute services.
The risks of high costs and repeat use associated with earned-wage
programs could also be ameliorated under the law of nonbank lenders. Under
federal law, third-party programs would not be able to charge or recommend
tips to military members and their dependents that exceed the 36% federal
usury limit.334 Under state law, fees or tips that result in triple-digit APRs
would be prohibited in several states where earned-wage programs are
currently offered.335 With respect to repeat use, some state law mitigates this
risk via amortization requirements and cooling-off periods.336 Under such
laws, earned-wage programs could be compelled to give users the option to
amortize reimbursement over several pay periods at no additional cost.337
Alternatively, earned-wage programs could be prohibited from authorizing
back-to-back transfers. Additionally, the law of nonbank lenders
contemplates some of the risks of undue loss that result under the salary-link
model.338 State and federal law place limitations on collection practices,
including the timing and amount of wage assignments.339 Such laws could
easily apply to restrict the nondefaultable transfers that result from automatic
and guaranteed reimbursement out of wages.
333
See supra Section II.B.1 (“[TILA enabled] price comparisons between substitute credit products
that were otherwise marketed along varying price schemes.”).
334
See Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987(b).
335
E.g., Megan Leonhardt, California Passes New Rules that Cap Personal Loan Interest at 36%,
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/13/california-passes-new-rules-that-cap-payday-loan-interest-at
-36percent.html [https://perma.cc/X8RP-YN9E] (Sept. 17, 2019, 4:46 PM) (discussing California state
law which prohibits lenders from charging more than 36% on consumer loans of $2,500 to $10,000).
336
E.g., Payday Loan Laws in Indiana, PANTALASSA LOAN, https://www.pantalassaloan.com/
indiana-payday-loan-laws.html [https://perma.cc/DVF7-Y5MG] (describing Indiana lender laws that
include cooling-off periods and a 15% cap on lender interest rate).
337
PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 251, at 1.
338
See supra Section III.C.2.b.
339
See supra Section II.B.
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2. The Cons
Although seemingly a good fit, the fragmented nature of the law of
nonbank lenders presents many drawbacks. First, whether the framework
effectively regulates the risks posed by earned-wage programs entirely
depends on where the services are offered, as some states are more restrictive
than others. Some laws would be so restrictive as to ban earned-wage
programs,340 while others would be so broad as to subject consumers to all
risks.341 Neither outcome would be ideal. Second, the state-by-state licensing
regime and compliance burden would subject most earned-wage providers
to the laws and oversight of more than fifty jurisdictions. Traditional
nonbank lenders like payday lenders and pawn shops historically operated
intrastate, making fragmented regulation more tolerable. However, FinTech
firms, like earned-wage providers, utilize technology to facilitate borderless
transacting. Their profitability is often contingent on scaling,342 which a stateby-state regulatory regime greatly inhibits, if not prohibits altogether.
In the past, nonbank lenders have attempted to gain access to
streamlined regulation by partnering with a bank or Native American tribe.
Under bank-partnership models, the nonbank lender conducts the
advertising, underwriting, and loan-issuance decisions.343 The bank partner
issues the loan and subsequently transfers the loan to the nonbank that
services the loan.344 Under tribal-partnership models, Native American tribes
have a nominal economic interest in the loan business that is primarily
operated by a nonbank lender.345 Nonbank lenders are thus indirectly able to
benefit from federal preemption under bank partnerships and from tribal
sovereign immunity under tribal partnerships. The result is that nonbanks
may offer uniform services and escape the burden of state-by-state regulatory
compliance and licensing. These partnerships also allow nonbanks to offer
340

See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 2020) (detailing New York state law
essentially banning payday lenders due to the 6% interest-rate cap in this statute).
341
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-14-362–367 (2021) (discussing Wyoming state law that
includes broad definitions and limits, such as a one-month maximum term, that places almost all risk on
the borrower).
342
See Brian Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 129, 131 (2017).
343
See Zane Gilmer, “True Lender” Litigation on the Rise: Recent Litigation and Enforcement
Actions Challenge Traditional Bank Partnership Model, STINSON LLP (Apr. 2, 2018), http://dodd-frank.
com/2018/04/02/true-lender-litigation-on-the-rise-recent-litigation-and-enforcement-actions-challengetraditional-bank-partnership-model/ [https://perma.cc/Q2AS-8SKV].
344
Id.
345
See Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are
Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751, 777 (2012)
(noting that some tribes receive 1%–2% of payday profits to partner with nontribal payday lenders).

1563

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

loans with interest rates and terms that may violate state consumer-protection
laws.346
However, the ongoing viability of these partnerships is questionable in
light of significant state opposition. A growing body of case law finds these
arrangements to be invalid based on the true lender doctrine.347 The true
lender doctrine disregards the form of the transaction to find the nonbank
lender as the true lender given its “predominant economic interest” in the
loan being issued.348 As the true lender, the lender cannot benefit from federal
preemption349 or tribal sovereign immunity.350 In the bank-partnership
context, a minority view holds that the transfer of a loan from a bank to a
nonbank lender causes the loan to lose its entitlement to federal
preemption.351 Ultimately, the shaky grounds on which earned-wage
programs might be able to enjoy federal preemption are likely insufficient to
overcome the operational hurdle of state-by-state compliance for the market
should nonbank-lender law apply.
Several more drawbacks exist under the law of nonbank lenders. The
law does not compel nonbank lenders to disclose customer information to
credit bureaus; rather, the law only requires that disclosure be accurate and
complete if volunteered by the lender.352 Additionally, in the context of small
loans, the law takes a roundabout approach to regulating repeat use (e.g.,
amortization requirements and cooling-off periods) rather than tackling the
root cause: the absence of an ability-to-repay analysis. The CFPB attempted
to remedy this gap in the law with a federal ability-to-pay rule for most smallsum lenders but reversed its position in 2018 to the dismay of consumer
interest groups.353 This rule, however, was drafted to explicitly exempt
employer-sponsored programs that facilitate nonrecourse transfers and any
programs with tip-based compensation models on the assumption that such
346
See id. at 764–67 (noting that some lenders claim tribal sovereign immunity to evade state usury
laws and payday bans).
347
See John Hannon, The True Lender Doctrine: Function over Form as a Reasonable Constraint
on the Exportation of Interest Rates, 67 DUKE L.J. 1261, 1280–83 (2018).
348
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL
4820635, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016), appeal denied, No. 17-80006 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2017).
349
See id. at *9.
350
See People ex rel. Owen v. Miami Nation Enters., 386 P.3d 357, 375–79 (Cal. 2016) (holding that
tribal sovereign immunity did not apply where tribes did not maintain operational control of payday
business).
351
See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 2015).
352
See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
353
See Kate Berry, CFPB to Scrap Key Underwriting Portion of Payday Rule, AM. BANKER (Jan.
14, 2019, 12:38 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-to-scrap-key-underwriting-portionof-payday-rule [https://perma.cc/CS82-S4AK].
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programs do not pose similar risks.354 Thus, even were the CFPB to
implement the rule as contemplated, many earned-wage programs would not
be subject to it.
Finally, the law of nonbank lenders in material respects applies
exclusively to lenders and loans. For example, TILA explicitly applies to
entities that provide “consumer credit” extended over “more than four
installments” or in exchange for a “finance charge.”355 Usury laws that
restrict fees narrowly apply to “loan[s] or [the] forbearance of any money,
goods, or things in action.”356 Laws that restrict repeat use apply specifically
to small-sum loans.357 The same is the case with laws applicable to
amortization and prepayment terms.358 Thus, to the extent that earned-wage
programs are money-transmission services, these rules would not apply.
C. The Law of FinTech: The FinTech Charter
The primary benefit of a FinTech charter from the OCC is that it
promises more streamlined regulation for efficient operations and
nationwide scaling. However, the charter has numerous shortcomings,
including its questionable long-term viability, onerous compliance
requirements, as well as its failure to clarify applicable laws for earned wage
access programs, offer adequate consumer protections, and regulate
substitute services.
Specifically, the OCC’s FinTech charter faces substantial legal
opposition which calls into question its future. A recent federal district court
decision found that, in the absence of congressional action authorizing the
FinTech charter, the OCC may issue national bank charters only to
depositary institutions.359 Although the decision is stayed pending appeal,360
354
See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,382, 44,413
(July 22, 2020).
355
Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 1026.1 (2018).
356
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 2020); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2 (West 2020)
(using similar language).
357
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(18)–(19) (West 2019) (prohibiting rollovers and requiring
twenty-four-hour cooling period between consecutive loan issuances); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 122/25, 2-30 (West 2019) (prohibiting rollovers and requiring seven-day cooling period between forty-fiveday lending period).
358
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-7-401(4) (West 2018) (requiring that after three consecutive
loans, the lender must offer a four-installment repayment plan at no additional cost).
359
Vullo v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that
the “business of banking” used in the National Bank Act “unambiguously requires receiving deposits as
an aspect of the business”).
360
See Brief for Appellee, Lacewell v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency, No. 19-4271 (2d Cir. July
23, 2020). In connection with this appeal, the author of this Article joined thirty-two other legal scholars
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the legal uncertainty likely contributes to why no firm has applied for a
FinTech charter.361 Additionally, the FinTech charter contemplates
significant compliance requirements that are not only discouragingly
onerous362 but also aimed at risks that are extremely remote for the earnedwage market. Systemic risk concerns would be misplaced for such a small,
relatively inconsequential segment of the financial market, and, as
previously noted, money-laundering concerns would be misplaced given the
nature of earned-wage transactions.363
Importantly, the FinTech charter provides no greater clarity as to which
laws—lending or money transmissions—govern earned wage access
programs. It simply assigns the OCC as regulator without specifying the
framework within which the OCC will regulate.364 The OCC historically has
not imposed or enforced comprehensive, service-term regulations of the kind
required to adequately protect against the risks identified herein. Indeed, the
CFPB was established in part to take such regulatory oversight away from
the OCC and other federal regulators that focus on solvency and systemic
risks.365 There is no reason to believe the OCC would be equipped or inclined
to take on such responsibility with respect to the earned-wage market.
Finally, the OCC does not supervise substitute service providers like
traditional payday lenders and state-chartered institutions offering smalldollar liquidity solutions. Inconsistent regulation and supervision of
in an amicus brief supporting the position that the OCC lacks authority to issue FinTech charters. See
Brief of Thirty-Three Banking Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee, Lacewell v. Off.
of Comptroller of Currency, No. 19-4271 (2d Cir. July 29, 2020).
361
Rachel Witkowski, Google and PayPal Explored OCC’s Fintech Charter, then Walked Away,
AM. BANKER (June 16, 2019, 9:50 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/google-and-paypalexplored-occs-fintech-charter-then-walked-away [https://perma.cc/M697-NH8N] (“Google and PayPal,
as well as several others, have since backed off over fears that they could harm existing relationships with
state regulators and concerns about whether the OCC will prevail in a legal challenge to its authority to
create the fintech charter.”).
362
Id. (“‘[P]eople that have come in and talked to [the OCC] realize [it] expect[s] real capital, real
liquidity, solid risk management programs and profitability . . . . That’s not an easy bar to get over.’”
(quoting former Comptroller of the Currency Joseph Otting)).
363
See supra Section IV.A; see also History of Anti-money Laundering Laws, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T
NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-laundering-laws [https://perma.cc/S5SU-7MS7].
364
See generally OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING
MANUAL SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES (2018).
365
See The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/
the-bureau/#:~:text=The%20CFPB%20was%20created%20to,was%20divided%20among%20several%
20agencies [https://perma.cc/LKN8-DZA2]. This approach borrows from the “twin peaks” model of
regulation common in other countries. Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial
Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1140 (2015) (describing the twin-peaks model used
in some countries).
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substitute services could have the negative effect of influencing consumer
decisions based on the “degree of regulation rather than on their relative
economic benefits.”366
*

*

*

In the absence of regulatory clarity and effective risk management,
many earned-wage users may be exposed to risks from which their
policymakers and regulators otherwise endeavor to protect them. Indeed,
military members may unwittingly find themselves dependent on a service
their military superiors would otherwise believe contributes to their reduced
morale and readiness, as in the payday-loan context. Still, other users may
be at risk for the very type of cyclical use, high fees, and overdraft charges
that their home states similarly seek to limit. And, probably most alarming,
customers who consciously avoid the ills of payday lending may fall victim
to earned-wage programs by viewing them as harmless money
transmissions. Yet, even if users successfully navigate the earned-wage
market, they may find it difficult to access cheaper traditional credit
products. In such instances, remaining perpetually entangled in the market’s
services means it could only be a matter of time until such users fall victim
to the market’s risks.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The preceding Parts III and IV demonstrate that earned-wage programs
pose significant risks to consumers that the existing legal framework for
money transmittersthe classification preferred by earned-wage
providerswholly fails to mitigate. However, Part IV also proves there are
shortcomings even for the more restrictive legal framework for lenders,
including its failure to curb certain risks unique to earned-wage markets and
its inability to provide uniform regulation for borderless transacting. This
Part explores solutions that can facilitate the earned-wage market’s growth

366
Robert L. Clarke & Todd J. Zywicki, Payday Lending, Bank Overdraft Protection, and Fair
Competition at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235, 237 (2013);
see also DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 69 (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
FinalReport_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY8G-26C3] (“Fairness, effective competition, and efficient
markets require consistent regulatory treatment for similar products.”).
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via uniformity without sacrificing consumer protection.367 It then considers
the implications of these proposals and addresses potential concerns.
A. Policy Recommendations
Banning a small-sum liquidity solution does not eliminate consumer
demand; rather, it directs consumers to substitutes that could be better or
worse.368 For this reason, it would not be ideal to ban earned-wage programs
altogether because, in some ways, they are improvements on payday loans
and similar substitute products. The earned-wage market adds lower price
points to the broader small-sum liquidity market, particularly when earnedwage programs are subsidized by employers.369 Earned-wage programs help
limit overexposure to debt since the programs more precisely assess expected
income flows.370 The ability to access funds via mobile and internet
applications can save time, costs, and inconvenience associated with travel
to brick-and-mortar storefronts that offer payday loans and similar solutions.
Moreover, increased competition in the market by FinTech providers could
even improve the quality and costs of the products and services offered by
traditional payday lenders and other substitute providers.371
Accordingly, the most effective policy will allow the market to grow
but in a way that minimizes consumer risks. As was the case for the earliest
367
As this market is rapidly developing, so too is the legal landscape. Policymakers at both the state
and federal level are currently exploring incremental steps to enable, monitor, and lightly regulate the
nascent market with narrow safe harbors, sandboxes, memoranda of understanding, and distinct licensing
regimes for earned-wage programs. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text; see also The DFPI
Signs MOUs Believed to Be Among the Nation’s First with Earned Wage Access Companies, CAL. DEP’T
FIN. PROT. & INNNOVATION (Jan. 27, 2021), https://dfpi.ca.gov/2021/01/27/the-dfpi-signs-mousbelieved-to-be-the-among-the-nations-first-with-earned-wage-access-companies/ [https://perma.cc/JFF3
-YZBL]. The recommendations in this Part should be considered in connection with any long-term policy
plan.
368
See Bhutta et al., supra note 227, at 225 (finding that consumer demand shifts to substitute
services like pawnshop services, bank overdrafts, or bounced checks when payday loans are banned,
thereby arguing that regulation of payday loans in isolation may be ineffective or counterproductive).
369
See supra Section III.B.1.a.
370
See supra Section III.B.1.b.
371
See, e.g., Inbal Lavi, The Rise of Robo-Advisors: How Banking and Wealth Management Is
Changing with Technology, MARTECH SERIES (Oct. 26, 2018), https://martechseries.com/mtsinsights/guest-authors/the-rise-of-robo-advisors-how-banking-and-wealth-management-is-changingwith-technology/ [https://perma.cc/FQ3J-NNJK] (discussing FinTech’s pressure on traditional loan
services to provide lower costs for higher functionality); Zelle: The Banking Industry’s Response to
Fintech Disruptors, MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 5, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/0
9/05/zelle-the-banking-industrys-response-to-fintech-di.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ANL9-HC8A]
(describing peer-to-peer payment service Zelle as “the banks’ answer to Venmo,” a mobile peer-to-peer
payment system, thereby highlighting FinTech driving traditional bank innovation to meet consumer
demand).
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banks established in the United States, the interstate nature of most earned
wage service models urges uniform regulation and oversight.372 However,
uniformity should not sacrifice the ability to curb identified risks to
consumer financial welfare through service-term regulations, including
uniform price disclosures, ability-to-repay rules, optional amortization
mechanics, mandatory credit reporting, and the right-to-rescind assignment.
1. Small-Sum Liquidity Law
The most effective regulation would apply consistently to earned-wage
programs and similar small-sum liquidity solutions like payday loans.
Application of the legal framework should be determined based on the
substantive similarities in transactions between consumers and providers
rather than technology, terminology, or context. Accordingly, the proposal
described herein, the Small-Sum Liquidity Law (the Small-Sum Law),
should broadly apply to institutions that offer liquidity to consumers in
exchange for a fee with reimbursement paid at a later time. The Small-Sum
Law should include five basic consumer-protection provisions intended to
curb the risks identified in this Article: uniform price disclosures, ability-torepay rules, optional installment-repayment mechanics, mandatory creditscore reporting, and right-to-rescind mechanics.
First, the law should compel all providers to make uniform price
disclosures. This particular proposal is likely the path of least resistance since
mandatory disclosures are oft-used policy tools for mitigating against
information asymmetries and incentivizing better consumer decisionmaking.373 Notwithstanding, the academic literature is extremely skeptical of
the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure, especially under TILA. 374 The
critiques, however, are rarely that mandatory disclosure inherently has zero
efficacy;375 rather, the effectiveness is likely to be severely diminished when
disclosures are too numerous, complex, lack material data points, or are
372
Cf. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 310–18
(1978) (reflecting the Court’s reluctance to limit national banks’ flexibility to export interest rates among
the states without specific congressional intent given the complexities of the national modern banking
system supported by the National Banking Act).
373
See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 647, 653–54, 659 (2011) (discussing the pervasiveness of disclosure rules for credit services,
including payday loans and mortgage lending, and for overdraft fees, noting that “[a]ttempts to protect
low-income borrowers often prompt disclosure requirements”).
374
See, e.g., id. at 679–727.
375
See Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success
or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 354 (2013) (noting that studies with negative findings for disclosure
effectiveness could nonetheless be read as demonstrating that disclosure is positively impacting
information access and outcomes for 10%–30% of consumers).
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proffered when consumers are unable to respond to such information.376 The
Small-Sum Law’s disclosure requirement is likely to avoid several of these
shortcomings because it will be simple and comprehensive. The law should
require earned-wage providers to prominently disclose uniform price
conversions, akin to an APR,377 for all fees, whether flat, subscription, or tip
based.378 This should be a relatively straightforward calculation since earnedwage programs involve simple fee and transaction structures. Admittedly,
however, the disclosure requirement is not intended to shift consumer
behavior for would-be payday borrowers. Instead, this requirement is
intended to help consumers who are price- or information-sensitive, such as
the debt collector who avoided payday loans but inadvertently found himself
exposed to earned-wage risks.379
Second, the law should establish an “ability to repay” (ATR) rule
applicable to all providers. Repeat use and its negative consequences are
likely to result regardless of whether an earned-wage program is third-party
or employer sponsored since both models have high pricing and balloonrepayment terms that fail to consider users’ other expenses. Consequently,
there is no need for a carve-out for the latter model. The ATR rule should
involve a two-part inquiry. First, the law should create an ATR presumption
wherein a specified percentage of take-home pay per pay period, or an “ATR
cap,” is deemed affordable without further inquiry. The ATR cap should
376
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 373, at 666 (discussing TILA); see also Lauren E.
Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD.
L. REV. 707, 767–68 (2006).
377
To be clear, the pricing metric need not be an APR. It need only be a uniform metric that reflects
typical usage patterns. More data on usage trends are, therefore, key to better understand the degree of
financial risk and to establish the most appropriate disclosure metric. A recent report published
simultaneously with this Article suggests that on average, earned-wage users make transfers
consecutively for at least six semimonthly periods, or in every pay period for three months. Thus, a pricing
metric based on quarterly percentage rates may be appropriate for the market. See DEVINA KHANNA &
ARJUN KAUSHAL, FIN. HEALTH NETWORK, EARNED WAGE ACCESS & DIRECT TO CONSUMER ADVANCE
USAGE TRENDS 8–9 (2021).
378
It is not enough that providers must comply with TILA, because certain small-sum liquidity
services (e.g., bank-overdraft protection) are currently carved out of TILA requirements. See CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, COMMENTS TO THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, IMPACTS OF
OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS ON CONSUMERS 19 (2012), https://consumerfed.org/pdfs/Comments.
CFPB.Overdraft.CRL.CFA%20.NCLC6.29.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q86Y-YCJB]. The SSLL will
enhance price competition amongst all similar providers. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION
69 (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LJJ5T3T] (“[S]imilar disclosure treatment for similar products enables consumers to make informed choices
based on a full appreciation of the nature and risks of the product and enables providers to compete fairly
and vigorously.”).
379
See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
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draw from empirical work, such as recent studies that demonstrate payday
borrowers can afford to apply only 5% of take-home pay toward paydayloan servicing.380 Second, should a provider’s repayment schedule exceed the
ATR cap, the law should compel the provider to conduct a more narrowly
tailored assessment of the user’s ability to repay. This two-part ATR rule
would reasonably ensure that users do not fall into costly cycles of use that
are difficult to escape. The simple ATR rule would also avoid imposing
prohibitive underwriting costs on providers.
Third, the law should establish that providers must offer installment
repayment options to consumers. While more flexible terms might result
from the ATR rule, the law should be explicit to mandate installments where
necessary to ensure affordability. State laws bar balloon repayment in several
contexts to protect consumers from undue financial strain. Installment
requirements exist in the payday-lending context in some states,381 even
when employers directly issue payroll advances or accidentally overpay
employees.382 The installment requirement should align with the ATR rule
such that installment payments in any pay period do not exceed the ATR cap.
Fourth, providers should be compelled to report consumer repayment
history. Admittedly, this significant intervention would set providers of
small-sum liquidity solutions apart from mainstream lenders who are not
compelled by existing regulation to report to credit bureaus. Nonetheless,
mainstream lenders feel pressure to report credit information to continue
accessing credit-bureau systems.383 Mandatory credit reporting under the
Small-Sum Law is a necessary intervention since providers do not rely on
credit-bureau reporting systems. Mandatory credit reporting could be an
escape valve for consumers who are trapped by poor or limited credit
histories—a true bridge to increased access to credit. It would also force
providers of small-sum liquidity solutions to improve services to maintain
consumer relationships. Although negative credit history would be included,
such history is in many instances already reported when defaulted
380

PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 251, at 2.
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-366(a) (2021) (“[A] consumer who is unable to repay a postdated check or similar arrangement when due may elect once every twelve (12) months to repay the postdated check or similar arrangement by means of an extended payment plan.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5815-17(3)(H) (2020) (“A lender shall not make a loan [for less than $5,000] unless the loan is an installment
loan . . . .”).
382
See, e.g., Barnhill v. Robert Saunders & Co., 177 Cal. Rptr. 803, 805–06 (1981) (holding that a
balloon payment on separation of employment to repay employee’s debt to employer is an unlawful
deduction); Cal. State Emps.’ Ass’n v. State, 243 Cal. Rptr. 602, 605 (1988) (holding that it is unlawful
to deduct from current payroll for past salary advances that were in error).
383
Brooks, supra note 271, at 1019–20.
381
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obligations, even within the payday-loan context, are transferred to
collection agencies.384 This proposal would improve the accuracy of credit
scoring. Additionally, it is an opportunity for providers to share with users
the benefit of the low default rates associated with these products.
Finally, employers and earned-wage providers must give users the right
to rescind or delay payroll deductions for earned-wage transfers, and such
right must be effectively disclosed. This would eliminate the collateralization
of employment, freeing users from feeling bound to a position as a result of
perpetual liquidity shortfalls. It would also give users the right of efficient
breach that is inherent in most consumer transactions. In a movement toward
Pareto optimality, the requirement would encourage efficient allocation of
user resources with respect to their employment and debt management.385
2.

Supervision and Enforcement

a. Federal level
The Small-Sum Law would ideally be enacted and enforced by a federal
regulator to ensure that there is uniform and efficient regulation of largely
nationwide services. Specifically, the CFPB is experienced in developing
and ensuring compliance with consumer-protection laws—it was created for
that very purpose. It has institutional knowledge based on internal research
regarding the risks associated with consumer lending generally and smallsum lending in particular.386 The CFPB has taken enforcement actions
against payday lenders387 and proposed rules to regulate the small-sum loan
market.388 Moreover, it has full examination and supervisory authority over
a host of financial service providers, including payday lenders.389
384
See Kelly Anne Smith, How to Respond When Your Debt Is Sent to Collections, FORBES (Feb.
26, 2020, 9:38 AM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/personal-loans/accounts-in-debt-collection/#howdoes-it-affect-your-credit-score [https://perma.cc/X2Y6-K74E] (“An account in collections is one of the
biggest blows to your credit score.”).
385
See Birmingham, supra note 311, at 284 (explaining how certain types of breach of contract
should be encouraged as it “is a movement toward Pareto optimality”).
386
See,
e.g.,
Data
and
Research,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/ [https://perma.cc/88N5-7URS] (listing CFPB’s
research databases).
387
See,
e.g.,
Think
Finance,
LLC,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/think-finance-llc-formerlyknown-think-finance-inc/ [https://perma.cc/2Y95-7A9U] (discussing a case the CFPB brought against
payday lender Think Finance, LLC).
388
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Rule to End Payday Debt Traps, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 2, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-proposes-rule-end-payday-debt-traps/ [https://perma.cc/VBZ9-NHUD].
389
Institutions Subject to CFPB Supervisory Authority, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/guidance/supervision-examinations/institutions/
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Accordingly, the CFPB is best positioned to be the federal regulator of a
small-sum liquidity sector that includes earned-wage programs.
An important threshold question is whether earned-wage providers fall
under the CFPB’s supervisory authority. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the
CFPB has authority to examine and supervise depositary institutions and
credit unions with assets exceeding $10 billion,390 mortgage lenders,391
student-loan lenders,392 payday lenders,393 designated “larger participant[s]”
of a particular consumer-finance market segment,394 and certain high-risk
market participants.395 Of these categories, there are two on which the CFPB
could rely to supervise earned-wage providers. First, earned-wage providers
could constitute payday lenders if the services are deemed to be extensions
or advances of credit. Such a determination may lead to judicial intervention
and statutory interpretation similar to that required in the early years of
payday lending.396 Alternatively, and as a potentially more efficient
approach, the CFPB could consult with the Federal Trade Commission to
issue a rule designating certain earned-wage providers as “larger
participants” in the earned-wage market.397 While this rule would not capture
all earned-wage providers, it would likely capture the major participants
identified in this Article and avoid the uncertainty and lengthy timeline of a
final judicial determination of whether earned-wage transfers constitute
credit.
b. State level
Although the Small-Sum Law should be implemented and enforced at
the federal level, practicality may require individual states to act first. State
[https://perma.cc/2FT6-4DCA]; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(A) (stating general categories of entities
that fall under the CFPB’s supervision).
390
12 U.S.C. § 5515(a).
391
Id. § 5514(a)(1)(A).
392
Id. § 5514(a)(1)(D).
393
Id. § 5514(a)(1)(E).
394
Id. § 5514(a)(1)(B).
395
Id. § 5514(a)(1)(C) (authorizing supervision of a market participant upon reasonable
determination of risks that participant poses to consumers based on a collection of consumer complaints
and notice to market participant with opportunity for that participant to respond).
396
See, e.g., Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 956 & n.4 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (“It is hard to imagine
how charges for exchanging money today for more money at a later date could be classified as anything
but interest on a loan when the transactions do not include a sale of property.”); In re Miller, 215 B.R.
970, 974 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997) (“[Defendants] are disbursing funds to people like the plaintiff on the
promise of repayment of the sum plus the ‘service charge’ . . . . If this is not an extension of credit, this
Court finds it hard to imagine any transaction that is.”); Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F.
Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (2000) (“A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that [Defendant] made loans to
[Plaintiff] . . . . By agreeing not to cash [plaintiff’s] check until his payday, [Defendant] forbore its right
to negotiate the checks.”).
397
12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(B).
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regulators could act to implement state-level small-sum liquidity laws like
the one described above. However, the states should not cripple the earnedwage market or other FinTech entrants with bifurcated and innumerable
regulatory requirements. Accordingly, it would be highly preferable for the
states to adopt a uniform model law.
B. Potential Concerns and Responses
The Small-Sum Law aims to benefit consumers by facilitating the
expansion of the earned-wage market’s better side and curbing its downside
risks with increased competition among substitute services as well as
improved transparency, affordability, and bargaining power for consumers.
Yet, the proposal is not without potential concerns. This Section addresses
three such concerns and demonstrates why the Small-Sum Law is
nonetheless the best option for regulating the earned-wage market.
1. Federalism
The existing small-sum liquidity market, including payday lending and
earned-wage programs, is within the primary jurisdiction of state (rather than
federal) lawmakers. Proponents of the bifurcated nature of financial
regulation might champion state-level regulation over federal-level
regulation as less at risk for regulatory capture and more effective in driving
robust consumer protections. However, the fragmented regulatory
framework for payday loans is a cautionary tale about the ineffectiveness of
state-based regulation in the small-sum loan market.398 State regulation
allows for gaping and inconsistent holes in base-level protections on a stateby-state basis. Providers are able to circumvent regulations by offering
services close to the borders between permissive states and restrictive
states399 and to exploit federal regulatory loopholes more explicitly by
offering services where otherwise prohibited.400 Earned-wage programs are
398
See Johnson, supra note 2, at 122 (“State-by-state efforts at regulation are inadequate and
inefficient because, as explained below, the rent-a-bank practice circumvents state laws designed to
protect consumers, and many states do not afford consumers a base level of necessary protections.”).
399
See, e.g., Anne Fleming, Federal Regulation of Payday Loans Is Actually a Win for States’ Rights,
WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/
wp/2017/10/09/federal-regulation-of-payday-loans-is-actually-a-win-for-states-rights/ [https://perma.cc/
B77R-66KR] (“Lenders in permissive states may continue to lend to borrowers in restrictive states in
violation of state law.”).
400
See, e.g., SUSANNA MONTEZEMOLO, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PAYDAY LENDING
ABUSES AND PREDATORY PRACTICES 8 (2013), https://www.responsiblelending.org/state-oflending/reports/10-Payday-Loans.pdf [https://perma.cc/338B-M9HZ] (“[B]anks offering open-ended
payday loans are able to circumvent the MLA.”); Shen Lu, How Payday Lenders Get Around Interest
Rate Regulations, MAGNIFY MONEY (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.magnifymoney.com/blog/news/how-
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likely to be even more effective at evading or inadvertently violating
regulation through borderless internet and mobile platforms than payday
lenders that operate primarily out of brick-and-mortar locations. Moreover,
as seen with payday regulation, state regulation in the broader small-sum
credit market does not foster a “race to the top” in reigning in market risks.
There is no reason to think regulation of the earned-wage market is going to
illicit a different state response. While state-based regulation has a long
history of failure in this sector, it is too early to tell whether federal-level
reforms would be counterproductive. To the contrary, uniform federal-level
consumer protections have historically been the solution when state law falls
short.401
2. Regulatory Experimentation
Proponents of state-level regulation might also be concerned that the
Small-Sum Law might quell necessary regulatory experimentation that is
otherwise likely to occur with varied state regimes in a nascent market.
Indeed, state-level policymakers are already considering different
approaches to regulating earned-wage programs. Some states are considering
distinct licensing frameworks for certain earned-wage programs. Other states
have entered into memoranda of understanding that allow market
participants to operate freely, subject to heightened reporting requirements.
Still others might consider subjecting earned-wage programs to restrictive
lending laws or take a “wait and see” approach to earned-wage concerns.
However, while fostering regulatory innovation, such disparate statelevel regimes might actually stifle market innovation and improvements in
the FinTech era.402 The operational hurdles of state-by-state licensing
schemes and regulatory oversight disadvantage new market entrants with
high start-up costs that can be prohibitive for their profit model.403 Also, such
bifurcated regulation may in effect disenfranchise citizens in certain states if
market regulation is driven primarily by a minority of large, powerful
states.404 Uniformity in regulation does not have to sacrifice experimentation.
Federal-level frameworks can facilitate experimentation, including, for
example, through regulatory sandboxes. When borderless transacting is an
payday-lenders-get-around-interest-rate-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/V3R2-U7FT] (discussing that
payday lenders evade regulation by operating as loan brokers instead of direct lenders, or by offering
installment loans or lines of credit instead of single-payment loans).
401
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1968, 7 C.F.R. § 1901.203; Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat.
74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a–77m).
402
See Knight, supra note 342, at 185–86.
403
Id. at 186.
404
Id. at 195.
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essential element to improved costs and service offerings in a marketplace,
borderless regulatory regimes should be created to facilitate its growth.
Moreover, not all experimentation is ideal. As states consider ways to
regulate earned-wage programs, they should be cautious not to adopt certain
features of early, unsuccessful efforts to reign in the earned-wage market.405
First, state policymakers should not reflexively adopt common policy
prescriptions like fee caps and transfer limits to curtail financial distress.
These prescriptions fail to appreciate that several features of earned-wage
programs work in concert (rather than independently) to make repayment
difficult and lead to habitual use. Second, policymakers should not narrowly
focus on limiting late fees; doing so risks ignoring the likelihood that users
will simply make additional transfers after a timely repayment, which has
the same effect of imposing a fee for a term extension. Third, policymakers
should not be satisfied that earned-wage programs’ loan-like repayment risks
are sufficiently curbed if services are nonrecourse or payments are not
reported to credit bureaus. Such an approach ignores the practical
enforcement mechanisms that can be more threatening than a potential
lawsuit. For employer-sponsored programs, it would be the need to find other
employment to avoid payment. For third-party programs, it would be the
need to endure bank nonsufficient-fund fees to avoid payment. Moreover,
eliminating the risk of a potential lawsuit over nonpayment is not worth the
trade-off of making the service credit invisible, especially since the service
is currently designed to be nearly default-proof in many contexts. Finally,
policymakers should refrain from barring payday lenders and earned-wage
providers from obtaining licenses under the same state licensing
frameworks. Such fragmented regulation fails to incent competition
necessary for broader market improvements and is likely to result in a
selection of market winners and losers based on policy effects rather than
optimal consumer services.
3. Market Contraction
Lastly, regulation is not without costs. The Small-Sum Law is likely to
impose compliance costs on earned-wage providers that must be weighed
against any potential returns for providing services. Consequently, there may
be some concern that the proposal will have the unintended effects of
eradicating the earned-wage market despite demand, thereby forcing

405
This critique is derived from a review of the first state proposal for a distinct earned-wage
licensing framework, which was proposed by the state legislature in California but failed to be passed
into law. See generally S. 472, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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consumers to seek out inferior and nefarious substitutes.406 However, the
proposal focuses on solutions that are low cost (e.g., price disclosure),
already exist in the market to some degree (e.g., installment requirements
and rescission rights), or are arguably necessary for consumer welfare while
giving providers flexibility to set terms (e.g., ATR requirements). In other
words, the Small-Sum Law is a moderate proposal that likely facilitates safer
innovations within the market while curbing downside risks.
Further, to limit the risk of inferior substitutes, the Small-Sum Law is
designed to broadly apply to a particular class of financial products based on
their risk profile rather than their form so that earned-wage programs, payday
loans, and innovations yet conceived are regulated under the same
framework. Thus, at best, the consequence might be to force innovation for
improved consumer services because arbitrage is not easily achievable; at
worst, the consequence might be a broader market contraction so significant
that the majority of consumers in this market are unable to lawfully meet
their basic needs. In this worst-case scenario, the market response raises a
set of fundamental questions. First, should the law facilitate a market that is
inherently incapable of offering affordable liquidity solutions to the most
financially vulnerable consumers?407 Second, is government involvement
required to develop sustainable options given the limits and failures of the
private market? Reality probably lies somewhere between the best- and
worst-case scenarios. Consequently, with the implementation of the SmallSum Law, policymakers should be clear-eyed about optimizing privatemarket solutions to address select small-sum liquidity concerns and to
facilitate efficient allocation of limited public resources for those consumers
the private markets cannot serve.
*

*

*

In sum, there are no regulatory frameworks that effectively mitigate the
risks of earned-wage programs while simultaneously fostering the
development of a robust small-sum liquidity market in the FinTech era. The
ideal framework consists of streamlined oversight and consumer protections
related to both process and service terms, including price-disclosure rules,
ability-to-repay requirements, optional amortization mechanics, mandatory
credit scoring, and the right to rescind assignments. While such a framework
406
Cf. Atkinson, supra note 196, at 1109 (summarizing the debate over the Payday Rule, noting that
opposition to payday-loan regulation includes a concern that such regulation would cause payday loans
to “dry up” and force low-income borrowers “to seek credit . . . from unseemly credit providers”).
407
See id. (examining whether credit is even an appropriate mechanism as a substitute for social
provisions to low-income consumers).
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would most efficiently work at the federal level under the statutory authority
of the CFPB, it could also be implemented via a state-level uniform model
law.
CONCLUSION
This Article develops a nascent conversation to encourage ongoing
scholarship on earned-wage programs. Important questions—including
whether these programs cause users to fall into cyclical debt traps or become
more financially distressed—are outside its scope but should be studied
empirically. Notwithstanding, this Article undertakes a deep-dive
assessment of the earned-wage market to make five contributions to legal
scholarship. First, it provides a taxonomy of the business models and fee
structures in the earned-wage market. Second, it explains that moneytransmission and loan services are differentiated by the latter’s deferred
repayment-feature mechanics, which introduce behavioral gaffes associated
with intertemporal decision-making and heighten nonpayment risks. Third,
it demonstrates that earned-wage programs and payday loans share features
that have been associated with financial harm to consumers in the latter
context. Fourth, it identifies certain features—the multiple fee structures and
the salary link—as raising financial-harm concerns that are unique to the
earned-wage market. Finally, it analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of
money-transmission law—under which earned-wage programs currently
operate—nonbank-lender law, and the FinTech charter to curtail the risks
presented by this multibillion-dollar market. In doing so, this Article
demonstrates how earned-wage programs pose risks that are not only
substantially similar to those posed by payday loans but also potentially
heightened in the context of earned-wage programs due to unique market and
product features and the regulatory laxity these programs currently enjoy.
Thus, regulatory intervention is necessary but should be tailored to
simultaneously protect consumers and incentivize the development of a
robust small-sum liquidity market in the FinTech era. The flaws in the
current system are largely rooted in the fact that federal law lacks effective
consumer-protection policies, and the patchwork of state regulations inhibits
the nationwide business models of nonbank, FinTech firms. Therefore, this
Article proposes that a comprehensive small-sum liquidity lawSmall-Sum
Liquidity Law be enacted at the federal level and enforced by the CFPB. In
doing so, it appreciates that inconsistent regulation typically results in
anticompetitive markets and is likely to push unsuspecting consumers
towards potentially more harmful products. While this Article does not detail
every aspect of the proposed law, it identifies five features that are critical to
the success of any such framework: uniform price disclosure, ability-to1578
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repay rules, optional amortization mechanics, mandatory credit reporting,
and the right to rescind assignments. A competitive and robust small-sum
liquidity market should emerge to bring solutions to low- and moderateincome consumers that are wealth enhancing. If earned-wage programs are
to replace the dominant payday lenders in the fringe financial sector, it is
imperative that they function as the expansion of access to low-cost and
mainstream services rather than the rise of fringe FinTech, or FringeTech,
services.
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